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The modern capitalist society, characterized by decentralized decision 
making and increasingly sophisticated products and services, turns on 
relationships of epistemic reliance, where laypersons depend upon advisors to 
guide their most important decisions.  Yet many of those advisors lack real 
expertise and many are biased by conflicting interests.  In such situations, 
laypersons are likely to make suboptimal decisions that sometimes aggregate 
into systematic failures, from soaring health care costs to market crashes.  
Regulators can attempt to manage the symptoms and worst abuses, but the 
fundamental problem of biased advice will remain.  There are many potential 
policy solutions to the fundamental problem, from outright bans on conflicting 
interests to disclosure mandates, yet their comparative effectiveness is poorly 
understood.
By constructing a decision task for human subjects and providing advice in 
various scenarios, this Article reports new field experiments testing alternative 
policy mechanisms.  Prior research has shown that disclosure mandates can 
be deleterious if they make advisors more biased, but this paper contextualizes 
those findings.  It turns out that disclosures may be valuable in settings where 
relative expertise is low, but deleterious where relative expertise is high.  By 
also disaggregating the data, one finds that disclosures of conflicting interests 
may hurt laypersons in the majority of situations where the conflicted advice is 
not actually biased.  Thus, the evidence suggests that, if they are to be at all 
effective, disclosure mandates should be narrowly tailored.
Most importantly, the evidence shows that a disclosure mandate improves 
layperson performance when unbiased advisors are also available.  Yet 
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laypersons appear to be poor judges of their need for unbiased advice, so 
market mechanisms may be ineffective for provisioning unbiased advice.  In 
the end, the presence of an unbiased advisor is the strongest determinant of 
layperson performance, and thus policymakers must develop ways of aligning 
the interests of advisors and laypersons.  Pay-for-performance, blinding of 
experts, and mandatory or subsidized second-opinion policies are likely to be 
helpful in aligning these interests.
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INTRODUCTION
A. The Problem 
Atul Gawande recently illustrated the economics of the practice of 
medicine in America by profiling one area—McAllen, Texas—which leads the 
nation in the problem of increasing health care costs without observable 
increases in quality: 
General surgeons are often asked to see patients with pain from 
gallstones.  If there aren’t any complications—and there usually 
aren’t—the pain goes away on its own or with pain medication. 
. . .  A surgeon has to provide reassurance (people are often 
scared and want to go straight to surgery), some education about 
gallstone disease and diet, perhaps a prescription for pain; in a few 
weeks, the surgeon might follow up.  But increasingly, I was told, 
McAllen surgeons simply operate.  The patient wasn’t going to 
moderate her diet, they tell themselves.  The pain was just going to 
come back.  And by operating they happen to make an extra seven 
hundred dollars.1
This vignette depicts a situation of epistemic reliance.2  The surgeon has a 
much better ability to determine how best to treat gallbladder pain compared to 
the patient, a layperson untrained in medicine, and the patient thus reasonably 
relies upon the surgeon for advice.  This vignette also depicts conflicting 
interests, where the surgeon is in part motivated (perhaps only subconsciously) 
by the prospect of receiving payment for the service of surgery, while the 
patient instead seeks health and, all other things being equal, prefers to avoid 
the expenses, pain, inconvenience, and risks of needless surgery.  Whether 
these conflicting interests cause surgeons to make different recommendations 
than they would otherwise make, i.e., whether the conflicts cause biases, is an 
empirical question.3
1 Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, NEW YORKER, June 1, 2009, at 36, 36, 38. 
2 Epistemology is the philosophical study of knowledge, i.e., how persons develop justified true beliefs.  
I call the expert–layperson relationship “epistemic reliance” because the layperson is unable to directly assess 
the truth, but instead must rely upon the advisor who is more able to do so.  See generally THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
EXPERTISE (Evan Selinger & Robert P. Crease eds., 2006) (collecting essays exploring this epistemic 
relationship). 
3 See Alan L. Hillman et al., How Do Financial Incentives Affect Physicians’ Clinical Decisions and the 
Financial Performance of Health Maintenance Organizations?, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 86, 86 (1989) 
(reviewing the evidence). 
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These sorts of situations, where informational asymmetry exists between 
doctor and patient, and their motivations are out of sync, can be found 
throughout medicine.  As one recent report explained the general problem: 
[C]onsumers . . . face a huge knowledge gap compared with care 
providers and are therefore highly reliant—and understandably so—
on the advice and guidance of their physicians.  In the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, patients may often assume that more care, 
or more expensive care, will lead to better outcomes. 
. . .  [Meanwhile, f]ee-for-service reimbursement, the primary 
method of payment for outpatient care, . . . creates financial 
incentives [for physicians] to provide more care, and care that is 
more costly.  More visits, more tests, more procedures all add up to 
more pay for providers and higher costs to the system.4
In the aggregate, as laypersons’ choices are systematically skewed by such 
biased advice, the problem creates massive externalities and systematic 
failures.  While serving as the director of the Congressional Budget Office, 
Peter Orszag argued that “our country’s financial health will in fact be 
determined primarily by the growth rate of per capita health care costs,” and he 
pointed at fee-for-service incentives as a primary cause.5  The health care 
industry is characterized by radically distributed decision making, with each 
patient deciding upon her own course of treatment within the range of 
treatments offered by providers and covered by public and private insurers.  
Thus, real reform of health care costs may need to focus on fixing the 
relationship of epistemic reliance and the conflicting interests at the bottom 
levels of the health care economy, since that is where the decisions are made. 
For another example of this problem of epistemic reliance and bias, 
consider the wave of home mortgage foreclosures that contributed to the 
“Great Recession.”  In the wake of the mortgage-lending debacle, which 
rocked global financial markets and caused policymakers to make 
unprecedented interventions in the financial industry, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation took a hard look at the subprime lending products and 
practices of the mortgage industry.6  Were too many loans being made to 
unqualified borrowers?  Were the exotic mortgage products destined to fail?  
4 DIANA FARRELL ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., ACCOUNTING FOR THE COST OF U.S. HEALTH CARE 
28, 31 (2008), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/reports/pdfs/healthcare/US_healthcare_report.pdf.  
5 Peter R. Orszag & Philip Ellis, The Challenge of Rising Health Care Costs—A View from the 
Congressional Budget Office, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1793, 1793–94 (2007). 
6 See generally Ryan Lizza, The Contrarian, NEW YORKER, July 6, 2009, at 30 (describing 
governmental responses to the foreclosure crisis). 
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The financial industry executives demurred about their practices and products, 
pointing instead toward the decentralized decisions made by every homebuyer 
taking out a mortgage and every homeowner considering a refinance.7  The 
executives said, “You know, it’s kind of like the N.R.A.—people kill people, 
not guns!  It’s not the mortgages, it’s the borrowers.”8
There is some truth in that demurrer.  Notwithstanding all the regulations at 
the margins, a mortgage agreement is ultimately a contract, founded on the 
idea of voluntarily chosen promises.9  Borrowers can bind themselves for 
decades to whatever financial products the banks want to offer them, and if the 
borrowers make bad decisions, then they suffer the consequences, along with 
the banks that made the bad bets when they issued the mortgages to those 
borrowers.
The borrower-centric analysis ignores the reality of epistemic reliance and 
conflicting interests, which underlie these transactions.  Borrowers have little 
ability to interpret voluminous and technical loan documents.  Nor can they 
compare the real costs of the various contractual terms or use actuarial data to 
weigh the likelihood of defaulting, given various economic scenarios over the 
next few decades.  As Elizabeth Warren explains, 
The effective deregulation of interest rates, coupled with innovations 
in credit charges (e.g., teaser rates, negative amortization, increased 
use of fees, cross-default clauses, penalty interest rates, and two-cycle 
billing), have turned ordinary credit transactions into devilishly 
complex financial undertakings.  Aggressive marketing, almost 
nonexistent in the 1970s, compounds the difficulty, shaping 
consumer demand in unexpected and costly directions.  And yet 
consumer capacity—measured both by available time and 
expertise—has not expanded to meet the demands of a changing 
credit marketplace.10
As a result, borrowers can either fly blind or rely upon the advice of others, 
most frequently mortgage brokers, who purportedly have expertise, experience, 
and information about the mortgage market, which the borrowers lack.11
7 See id.
8 Id. at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
9 See FDIC v. Hennessee, 966 F.2d 534, 537 (10th Cir. 1992) (“[A] mortgage is a contract and is 
generally subject to the rules of construction applicable to contracts.”). 
10 Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY, Summer 2007, at 8, 10.
11 See id. at 12 (noting mortgage brokers’ advertisements, e.g., “a friend to help you find the best possible 
mortgage” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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The borrower–broker reliance relationship is, however, skewed by 
conflicting interests.  As Joseph Stiglitz explains in his postmortem on the 
causes of the Great Recession, mortgage brokers “were supposed to be 
working for the borrower, but they often received kickbacks from the lender—
an obvious conflict of interest. . . .  Worse, the brokers got the biggest rewards 
for steering borrowers into the riskiest mortgages, adjustable-rate loans with 
prepayment penalties, and even got kickbacks when the borrower 
refinanced.”12  In short, their advice was biased.  If too many of these 
mortgages are being issued to unqualified borrowers, or if too many of these 
mortgages are defaulting, the brokers may be a major cause.13  One scholar 
explains that this 
[i]nformation asymmetry [between borrower and broker] enables a 
predatory lender or mortgage broker to exert dominance over the 
borrower in the initial marketing of the loan and to insert into the 
loan documents terms that produce destructive effects, such as 
stripping the borrower’s equity in her property or creating conditions 
that too often make foreclosure inevitable.14
If this account is correct, it expands the policymaker’s inquiry beyond the 
legalistic notion of a contract as the voluntary promises of two parties and 
instead demands attention to the epistemic context in which these decisions are 
made, a context centered on a biased advisor.15  As long as the primary 
decisionmakers in this economic system lack the epistemic resources to make 
wise decisions by themselves, and as long as their advisors are motivated by 
interests other than the well-being of the decisionmakers, it seems that 
individual failures and systematic problems are inevitable. 
Escalating health care costs and the crashing mortgage finance sector are 
just two of the most obvious examples of the problem of biased expertise, 
12 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL 89 (2010); see also Michael S. Barr et al., Behaviorally Informed Home 
Mortgage Credit Regulation, in BORROWING TO LIVE 170, 175–76 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 
2008) (describing incentives for mortgage brokers to steer reliant borrowers to more expensive loan options); 
Warren, supra note 10, at 12–13 (describing the type of “broker who is working only for himself, taking what 
amounts to a bribe from a mortgage company to steer a family into a higher-priced mortgage than it could 
qualify for, all the while assuring the family that this is the best possible deal”). 
13 See Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr., Effecting Responsibility in the Mortgage Broker-Borrower Relationship: A 
Role for Agency Principles in Predatory Lending Regulation, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1471 (2005). 
14 Id. at 1473 (footnotes omitted). 
15 See generally Gillian K. Hadfield et al., Information-Based Principles for Rethinking Consumer 
Protection Policy, 21 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 131, 140 (1998) (“Perhaps the most important lesson that emerges 
from modern bargaining theory is the essential role that information, and in particular information asymmetry, 
plays in bargaining.”). 
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where laypersons relied upon advisors to make some of the most important 
decisions in their own lives, but received bad advice that aggregated into 
systemic failures.  Without looking beyond the front pages of the daily 
newspaper, one can find many other examples of this problem.16  Indeed, one 
might argue that these sorts of decisions are archetypical of modern capitalism, 
which is defined by distributed, decentralized decision making.  It depends on 
each farmer, each household, each worker, and each business to make their 
own more or less rational decisions as to their own consumption and 
production functions.  As society becomes increasingly complex—as new 
medical treatments are discovered and new financial instruments are crafted, as 
new chemicals are put into our foods and as new high-tech tools are deployed 
in our workplaces—distributed decisionmakers must rely upon specialists who 
have developed expertise in understanding and using these sophisticated 
products.  The economics of those advisory relationships then become the 
central questions for understanding the economics of society. 
B. Potential Policy Solutions 
When these ground-level problems between laypersons and their biased 
advisors bubble up into system-wide crises, policymakers may search for 
solutions.  A reflexive answer is to implement top-down substantive 
regulations of affected industries.  Regulators will and should aim for 
seemingly low-hanging (but rotten) fruit that can be easily lopped-off—i.e., 
banning those products that are little more than “tricks and traps” for 
consumers and that “have no place in a well-functioning market.”17  These are 
the products whose costs or risks are so obviously out of proportion to the 
benefits that no well-informed consumer would ever utilize them.  Whether it 
16 For another example of this dynamic, scholars of the accounting industry explain: 
Conflicts of interest played a central role in the corporate scandals that shook America at the turn 
of the twenty-first century.  Many companies have joined Enron and WorldCom in issuing 
earnings restatements as a result of inaccuracies in published financial reports. . . .  At the root of 
both this mismanagement and the failure of monitoring systems lie conflicts of 
interest. . . .  Accounting firms have incentives to avoid providing negative audit opinions to the 
managers who hire them and pay their auditing fees. 
Don A. Moore et al., Conflicts of Interest and the Case of Auditor Independence: Moral Seduction and 
Strategic Issue Cycling, 31 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 10, 10 (2006).  Investors rely upon these accounting firms’ 
privileged access and special expertise in evaluating company finances, and simply must do so.  Yet, the 
reliance relationship is undermined by such predictable biases.  Similarly, scholars have pointed to the 
systematic biases that realtors insert into the real estate market, which were likely responsible for exacerbating 
the real estate bubble and also helped to destroy billions of dollars of net worth held by individual citizens. 
17 Warren, supra note 10, at 11. 
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is an onerous term in a mortgage document or an unproven drug, the 
government is sometimes willing to substitute its judgment for those of the 
consumer and simply ban that transaction.18  Let us call this general category 
of regulations, which specifically focus on the appropriateness of products and 
services, “substantive” regulations.19
Substantive regulation has limits.  First, this sort of governmental 
paternalism is anathema to deeply held values.  In medicine most clearly, it has 
long been understood that “[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind 
has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.”20  There are 
also epistemic problems.  Many products and services may be good for some 
consumers in some situations, but bad for others in other situations, which 
makes it quite difficult for the regulator to effectively control the substance of 
the transaction by ex ante decree.  A given treatment may only work for 10% 
of patients, but the difficult question for the surgeon and the layperson is to 
determine whether this patient will be in the 10% or the 90%.21  If laypersons 
could simply follow a rote guideline to decide whether to undergo surgery, or 
to determine which mortgage to buy, they would not need the expert’s advice 
at all.  Thus, the very category of cases where biased advice is the problem is 
also the category of cases where substantive regulation is least likely to be 
effective.  In these contexts, substantive regulation becomes a blunt instrument, 
doing harm as often as it does good.22
Substantive regulation also faces a moving target.  By simply capping 
interest rates, regulators of the consumer financial sector in the 1960s may 
have been able to do some good.  But much has changed.  As Elizabeth Warren 
18 For example, a regulator can prosecute surgeons who order treatments that are obviously unnecessary, 
from the perspective of the regulator.  See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374, 1375 (6th Cir. 
1988) (prosecuting a doctor for defrauding Medicare by ordering superfluous treatment). 
19 See Hadfield et al., supra note 15, at 134 (distinguishing between informational and substantive 
regulation). 
20 Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). 
21 See Richard A. Epstein, Regulatory Paternalism in the Market for Drugs: Lessons from Vioxx and 
Celebrex, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 741, 746–47 (2005) (“The regulator who works upstream of 
the physician and patient lacks any knowledge of individuated circumstances that should rationally influence 
the decision of which drug, if any, to take, and in what dosage.  So long as physicians and patients have some 
skill in locating the patient’s position in the distribution, there is no reason to rely on the upstream averages 
that the FDA uses.  Patients and physicians should be allowed to incorporate downstream knowledge into their 
decisions.”). 
22 Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for 
“Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1212 (2003) (“[T]o the extent that paternalism prevents 
people from behaving in their own best interests, paternalism may prove costly.”). 
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writes, “[I]nnovation in financial products has produced incomprehensible 
terms and sharp practices that have left families at the mercy of those who 
write the contracts.”23  When regulators do impose substantive controls, the 
financial industry simply innovates again to create new mechanisms to exploit 
their financial interests, in a pattern that scholars call a “regulatory dialectic.”24
Whether industry moves through loopholes left by captured regulators, or by 
redefining the financial products into new fungible forms, the problems seem 
to just return.25
Thus, real reform of health care and lending practices, to protect consumers 
and stabilize the economy over the long term, may require reform of the 
epistemic and economic situations in which patients and borrowers make their 
decisions.  It may be more fruitful to focus reform efforts on those micro-level 
individual decisions themselves, if those are, after all, a root cause of the 
macro-level problems.  There are several avenues for such regulation of the 
advisory relationship. 
As an initial solution to this problem of biased advice, policymakers have 
mandated that advisors disclose their conflicting interests to the laypersons 
who rely upon them.26  Reflecting this first policy solution is Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26(a), which requires expert witnesses to disclose how much 
litigants pay for their services,27 presumably so the laypersons on the jury can 
discount the testimony accordingly.  Similarly, SEC Rule 10(b) requires that a 
broker who is acting as a principal in a transaction must disclose that fact to the 
customer.28  Laws increasingly require that physicians disclose their ties to the 
pharmaceutical industry, at least indirectly through websites that are 
23 Warren, supra note 10, at 9. 
24 See e.g., Edward J. Kane, Impact of Regulation on Economic Behavior: Accelerating Inflation, 
Technological Innovation, and the Decreasing Effectiveness of Banking Regulation, 36 J. FIN. 355, 355 (1981);
Merton H. Miller, Financial Innovation: The Last Twenty Years and the Next, 21 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 459, 461 (1986). 
25 See Kane, supra note 24, at 355; see also Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest—Good While Supplies 
Last: A Study of Payday Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 590 (2010) (identifying ways in 
which payday lenders tweaked or repacked their financial products to avoid consumer protection regulations). 
26 See Margaret Z. Johns, Informed Consent: Requiring Doctors to Disclose Off-Label Prescriptions and 
Conflicts of Interest, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 1011–12, 1020–22 (2007) (detailing requirements that doctors 
disclose conflicting interests to patients). 
27 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a). 
28 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–10 (2009). 
ROBERTSON GALLEYSFINAL 3/25/2011 12:05 PM 
662 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60 
theoretically available to patients.29  Realtors who undertake to represent both 
the buyer and seller in a transaction are required to notify the clients that 
“[r]epresenting more than one party to a transaction presents a conflict of 
interest since both clients may rely upon [the realtor’s] advice and the client’s 
respective interests may be adverse to each other.”30  Such disclosure 
mechanisms can serve two purposes: protecting laypersons’ autonomy to make 
informed choices and improving the quality of the choices they make.31
However, recent economic modeling and empirical research suggest that 
disclosure mandates may be counterproductive to the layperson’s own welfare 
if they worsen the quality of advice given or undermine trust, and yet fail to 
improve layperson performance.32  Still, many laypersons say that they want 
disclosures,33 and policymakers continue to institute new and broader 
disclosure mandates.34
Another policy response is to proscribe the conflict by banning those who 
advise laypersons from also having conflicting interests.35  For example, 
federal law prohibits doctors from receiving kickbacks for referring patients.36
Likewise, the FDA “permits financially disinterested physicians to promote 
off-label indications . . . but forbids other physicians” who have ties to the 
29 Arlene Weintraub, New Health Law Will Require Industry to Disclose Payments to Physicians, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2010/april/26/physician-payment-
disclosures.aspx (describing various laws that require physician–patient disclosure). 
30 ILL. ASS’N OF REALTORS, FORM 335: DISCLOSURE AND CONSENT TO DUAL AGENCY (2000), available 
at http://www.ppreservices.com/forms/dualagencyconsent.pdf. 
31 Dennis F. Thompson, Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 573, 575 
(1993) (“An advantage of disclosure is that it gives those who would be affected, or who are otherwise in a 
good position to assess the risks, information they need to make their own decisions.”); see also Johns, supra
note 26, at 1015; Marc A. Rodwin, Physicians’ Conflicts of Interest, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1405, 1406 
(1989). 
32 Daylian M. Cain, George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects 
of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 18 (2005); Ming Li & Kristóf Madarász, When 
Mandatory Disclosure Hurts: Expert Advice and Conflicting Interests, 139 J. ECON. THEORY 47, 48–50, 60, 
62–63 (2008). 
33 Christine Grady et al., The Limits of Disclosure: What Research Subjects Want to Know About 
Investigator Financial Interests, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 592, 597–98 (2006). 
34 Troyen A. Brennan & Michelle M. Mello, Sunshine Laws and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 297 
JAMA 1255, 1256 (2007). 
35 See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Health Industry Practices That Create Conflicts of Interest, 295 JAMA 
429, 431 (2006) (“[M]any current practices should be prohibited and others should be more strictly regulated 
to eliminate potential sources of unwarranted influence.”). 
36 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b(b) (2006); see also, e.g., United States v. Goss, 96 F. App’x 365 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(applying the anti-kickback statute in the context of diagnostic referrals). 
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pharmaceutical industry from undertaking those same promotions.37  In the 
field of human subjects research, where clinicians induce their patients to join 
clinical trials, there are widespread calls for additional limits to create 
“financial neutrality between treatment and research, thus ensuring that a 
physician’s decision to conduct clinical research, as well as his or her decision 
to recommend that a particular individual participate in a clinical trial, is 
grounded in reasons unrelated to investigator compensation.”38  If these 
policies succeed, they convert conflicted advisors into non-conflicted advisors.  
They do so by forcing the advisor to choose between her advisory business and 
her alternative source of business. 
An alternative policy option concedes that primary advisors may be biased 
but mandates that particularly vulnerable laypersons be given independent 
unbiased advice, before acting on the advice provided by conflicted experts.  
Some states require that senior citizens get a second opinion from an 
independent advisor before agreeing to a reverse mortgage on their homes.39
Medicaid, Medicare, and private health insurers have required that patients get 
second opinions before acting on advice from physicians with conflicting 
interests.40  Likewise, under Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, a treating 
physician may recommend assisted suicide, but a patient seeking to end her life 
must get confirmation from a consulting physician, who may approach the case 
more objectively.41  The federal requirement that clinical research studies using 
human subjects must first be approved by an institutional review board (IRB) 
may also reflect this insight, because one primary function of the IRB is to 
independently assess the risks to layperson participants and provide some 
advice about those risks in an “informed consent” form.42  There are also 
37 Gregory Conko, Truth or Consequences: The Perils and Protection of Off-Label Drug and Medical 
Device Promotion, 21 HEALTH MATRIX (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 15), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1677609. 
38 KATHLEEN M. BOOZANG ET AL., SETON HALL UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, CTR. FOR HEALTH & PHARM. LAW
& POLICY, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CLINICAL TRIAL RECRUITMENT & ENROLLMENT: A CALL FOR 
INCREASED OVERSIGHT 1 (2009), available at http://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/HealthTechIP/upload/ 
health_center_whitepaper_nov2009.pdf. 
39 E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 167E, § 7 (LexisNexis 2009). 
40 Susan P. Shapiro, Bushwhacking the Ethical High Road: Conflict of Interest in the Practice of Law 
and Real Life, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 87, 238 (2003); see, e.g., Damare v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. Med. 
Care Plan, No. 92-1779, 1993 WL 92503, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 24, 1993) (quoting the second-opinion policy 
of one health insurer). 
41 OR. REV. STAT. § 127.820 (2010). 
42 See 21 C.F.R. § 56.109 (2010). 
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various ombudsperson programs, in which a purportedly independent advisor 
is assigned to protect the interests of a vulnerable class of persons.43
Some policies nudge laypersons toward independent advice, without 
actually mandating it.  For example, lawyers are prohibited from entering into 
business transactions or settling malpractice claims with their own clients, 
unless the client is first “advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is 
given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel 
on the transaction.”44  Likewise, realtors who propose to serve in dual agency 
relationships must advise their clients “to seek independent advice from [their] 
advisors or attorneys before signing any documents in this transaction.”45  This 
sort of policy is something more than a disclosure of a conflict, but less than a 
mandate for a second opinion. 
A related policy response is for the regulator itself to provide independent 
advice, or at least user-friendly information, to laypersons.  In the litigation 
setting, courts have long had the power to bring their own expert witnesses, as 
an antidote to the biases of hired-gun expert witnesses.46  With few exceptions, 
the courts have generally declined to do so, however.47  In the market, 
government-mandated vehicle rollover ratings, gas mileage ratings, appliance 
efficiency standards, and annual percentage rates can be useful alternatives to 
the cheap talk of a salesman.48  These interventions can be viewed as providing 
alternative sources of unbiased advice, or they can be understood as more 
fundamental solutions that reduce the level of epistemic asymmetry between 
advisor and client, by raising the abilities of the client. 
Another policy solution is to do nothing, to assume that the market will 
itself resolve this problem.  If laypersons need unbiased advice to make 
43 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 333 (2006) (Bankruptcy Code provision providing for appointment of “patient 
care ombudsman” when health care provider declares bankruptcy); DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
EFFECTIVE OMBUDSMAN PROGRAMS (1991), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-90-02122.pdf 
(surveying six such programs in the nursing home context); Maxwell J. Mehlman, Medical Advocates: A Call 
for a New Profession, 1 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 299 (1996) (describing such programs in nursing homes and 
managed care programs). 
44 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a)(2), (h)(2) (2010). 
45 ILL. ASS’N OF REALTORS, supra note 30, at 1. 
46 FED. R. EVID. 706. 
47 See Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 199−201 (2010). 
48 See generally ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 
(2007) (reviewing the history of informational disclosure mandates).  On the other hand, in the financial 
industry, the pages and pages of legalese disclosures seem to simply present an opportunity to hide the most 
unscrupulous needles in a haystack of verbiage.  See Warren, supra note 10, at 11–12 (describing the 
increasing length and complexity of credit card contracts). 
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decisions for their own welfare, then there should be a market of such advisors; 
laypersons could simply buy the advice that they need, paying a premium for 
unbiased over biased advisors, if necessary.  For example, given the inaction of 
the courts to address the hired-gun problem in litigation, I have developed the 
concept of “blind experts,” which would be brought by litigants themselves 
acting in their own self-interests.49  Or in the health care setting, if one is 
concerned about the conflicts of interest inherent in a fee-for-surgery practice, 
one can instead join a managed care organization, though these surgeons may 
have the opposite biases.50  In the financial markets, there are brokerages who 
are compensated on a fee-per-trade basis (which thus creates an incentive to 
churn the accounts), and there are others compensated on the basis of the 
amount of assets under management (which thus creates an incentive to 
perform, or to invest money in advertising for more clients at least).51  There 
are other tradeoffs to be made; it may not be possible to perfectly align 
incentives, and laypersons may fail to appreciate and appropriately value non-
conflicted advice over conflicted advice.52  Whether laypersons actually do so 
is an empirical question explored below. 
So a range of potential policy responses exists.  Unfortunately, the 
comparative effectiveness of these multifarious policy alternatives remains 
poorly understood.  Through a series of behavioral experiments in a laboratory 
setting, the present study tests these policies against each other and advances 
the hypothesis that the production and provision of unbiased sources of advice 
is the most promising policy solution to this problem of biased advice in 
contexts of epistemic asymmetry. 
49 Robertson, supra note 47, at 179−80. 
50 See Howard Brody, The Physician–Patient Relationship, in MEDICAL ETHICS 75, 93 (Robert M. 
Veatch ed., 2d ed. 1997) (describing conflicts between patient welfare and obligations to health care plans in 
managed care situations). 
51 Craig J. McCann, Churning, 9 J. LEGAL ECON. 49, 49 (1999). 
52 See generally Saul Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts in Agency Arrangements: Lawyers, Real 
Estate Brokers, Underwriters, and Other Agents’ Rewards, 36 J.L. & ECON. 503 (1993) (explaining why 
solutions to these sorts of agency problems are not found in practice as frequently as one might expect based 
on economic theory). 
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I. HOW A MANDATORY DISCLOSURE POLICY CAN HURT LAYPERSONS BY 
DEGRADING THE ADVICE GIVEN
A. The Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore Study (CLM) 
Only recently have scholars begun to test empirically how mandated 
disclosures about experts’ conflicting interests actually impact layperson 
decision making.  One might worry that such disclosure policies are useless, as 
several studies have suggested.53  However, in 2005, Daylian Cain, George 
Loewenstein, and Don Moore published a study (CLM) concluding that 
disclosure mandates can actually be deleterious.54  A disclosure mandate may 
actually hurt the very laypersons it is designed to protect.55
The CLM study merits extended discussion here not only for its intrinsic 
interest, but also because its methods are the basis for the present study.  CLM 
put students at Carnegie Mellon University in either of two roles, “estimators” 
and “advisors,” with the task of ascertaining the values of assorted coins in 
each of six jars.56  This estimation task served as a proxy for real-world tasks 
that laypersons face, such as deciding how much a house is worth, how much a 
company stock is worth, and whether a surgical procedure is worthwhile given 
53 For example, in one survey-based study, Lindsay Hampson and colleagues found that “[m]ost patients 
in cancer-research trials were not worried about financial ties between researchers or medical centers and drug 
companies and would still have enrolled in the trial if they had known about such financial ties.”  Lindsay A. 
Hampson et al., Patients’ Views on Financial Conflicts of Interest in Cancer Research Trials, 355 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 2330, 2330 (2006).  An experimental study by Kevin Weinfurt and colleagues randomized human 
subjects considering whether to participate in a hypothetical clinical trial into three conditions: one where there 
was no disclosed conflict, one where the researchers disclosed that they had an equity stake in an interested 
business, and one where the researchers disclosed receiving a per-participating-patient payment from an 
interested business.  Kevin P. Weinfurt et al., Effects of Disclosing Financial Interests on Participation in 
Medical Research: A Randomized Vignette Trial, 156 AM. HEART J. 689 (2008).  Subjects in the equity group 
expressed significantly less willingness to participate than in the other two conditions, though the causal 
mechanism for this preference between the two forms of conflict was unclear.  Id. at 691.  Since there was no 
way to specify the optimal participation rate in each condition, the Weinfurt study provides no way to assess 
whether, on net, the disclosure mandate helped or hurt the participants.   
The disclosure problem also arises at a higher level, where physicians are the relative laypersons 
relying on the expertise of scientists advising them through biomedical journal articles.  Gabriel Silverman and 
colleagues tested physicians reviewing biomedical journal abstracts that reported the efficacy of a new drug, 
with and without disclosed conflicts of interest.  Gabriel K. Silverman et al., Failure to Discount for Conflict 
of Interest When Evaluating Medical Literature: A Randomised Trial of Physicians, 36 J. MED. ETHICS 265
(2010).  The study found that the disclosures had no significant impact on the physicians’ reliance on the 
study, as measured by the physicians’ likelihood of prescribing the drug.  Id. at 265. 
54 Cain et al., supra note 32. 
55 Id. at 22. 
56 Id. at 9. 
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its apparent benefits and costs.57  Although contrived and stylized, the coins 
task allowed the researchers to specify a concrete measure of accuracy, and 
thus provided a mechanism for judging layperson performance that may be 
analogous to real-world measures of utility (such as health or wealth), where 
the layperson’s practical decision turns out to be objectively good or bad for 
him. 
To create epistemic asymmetry, CLM gave the estimators only glimpses of 
the jars of coins at a distance, but the advisors were given some expertise in the 
task, as they had more time to hold and examine the jars and were told a range 
of potential values.58  CLM also created conflicting interests.  The CLM 
estimators were always compensated on the basis of the accuracy of their 
estimates, while the advisors’ compensation varied across the three conditions 
of the study.59  In the first condition (labeled “accurate”), the advisors were 
compensated based on the accuracy of the estimators, thus aligning their 
interests, and the estimator was advised of this fact.60  In the second 
(“high/disclosed”) and third (“high/undisclosed”) conditions, the advisors were 
told that they would be compensated based on how high the estimator’s guess 
was.  This fact was disclosed to the estimators in the second, but not the third, 
condition, and the advisors knew whether their conflict would be disclosed.61
Thus, CLM was able to test the comparative effectiveness of the disclosure 
mandate in the high/disclosed condition versus the high/undisclosed condition, 
to determine which one best approximated the performance of the accurate 
condition. 
CLM found that estimators performed best in the accurate condition and 
somewhat worse when receiving biased advice in the high/undisclosed 
condition, as would be expected.62  More surprisingly, across the two 
conditions where a conflict of interest existed, the estimators did worse in the 
mandatory disclosure condition (high/disclosed).63  This occurred for two 
reasons.  First, the advisors gave significantly worse advice in the disclosed 
57 Id. at 20. 
58 Id. at 9–10. 
59 Id. at 10. 
60 Id.  After receiving the substantive advice, the estimators were told: “Note: The advisor is paid based 
on how accurate the estimator is in estimating the worth of the jar of coins.”  Id.
61 Id.  The conflict was disclosed as follows: “Note: The advisor is paid based on how high the estimator 
is in estimating the worth of the jar of coins.”  Id.  No such disclosure was given in the third condition, even 
though there was a conflicting interest.  Id.
62 Id. at 17. 
63 Id.
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condition than in the undisclosed condition.64  The advisors apparently felt that 
the disclosure gave them a “moral license” to be even more biased, since the 
layperson was on notice that the advice may be biased and they could take it or 
leave it.65 Caveat emptor.  Second, the estimators failed to effectively use the 
disclosure to adjust for the inaccuracy of the given advice, presumably because 
they had little independent way to assess whether and to what extent the 
advisors were actually biased and because they had no other source of advice 
to rely upon instead.66  When you are told that your only advisor is conflicted, 
it is not precisely clear what you should do with such information. 
B. The Present Experiment’s Replication and Extension of CLM 
Like the CLM study, the present study involved layperson estimators 
relying on advisors for a coins-in-jars estimation task with incentives for 
accuracy, but this Article’s study was conducted online.  The specific methods 
for recruiting human subjects and running the experiment are described in the 
notes and the Methodological Appendix.67  The study focused only upon the 
behavior of the estimators, here called laypersons, across twelve experimental 
conditions.  Unbeknownst to the participants, the expert advice was simulated 
based on the results of the CLM study, using the means for reported advice 
given in the accurate, high/disclosed, and high/undisclosed conditions.68
Table 1 in the Appendix presents results on the comparable conditions in 
the CLM study and the present study.  To measure the effectiveness of 
disclosures, the CLM study and the present study used “virtual errors,” which 
are defined as the absolute value of the difference between the layperson’s 
estimate and the expert’s personal assessment in the accurate condition, 
64 Id. at 13. 
65 Id. at 7. 
66 Id. at 17. 
67 This study used the same values of coins in six jars as the CLM study, though subjects were shown 
small, low-resolution photographs of such jars rather than actual jars.  The jars photographed had the same 
total value as each of the CLM study’s jars but likely consisted of different combinations of quarters, dimes, 
nickels, and pennies.  The photographs were 359 by 336 pixels in size.  See the Methodological Appendix 
infra for more information about the jars’ values and photographs thereof. 
68 As in the CLM study, participants were told that they would receive advice from “advisors who have 
actually held those jars, who had several minutes to examine them, and who have been told the range of 
potential values.”  Cf. Cain et al., supra note 32, at 9 (discussing experimental methods).  The participants 
were given the advice and other prompts depending on the experimental conditions, and were then asked to 
render estimates of the value of the coins.  After each estimate, the laypersons also disclosed their confidence 
in the accuracy of their estimates.  Once answers were submitted for one jar, participants then repeated the task 
for another jar and were not able to go back and change their answers. 
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averaged across the six jars.69  This provides, as a benchmark, a measure of 
what an independent, well-informed observer thinks.  If the laypersons 
performed as well as an expert, then one might assume that the advisory 
relationship was working perfectly.70
It is worthwhile to attempt to replicate the CLM findings.71  Doing so 
confirms the essential relationships shown by the CLM study.  First, as one 
would expect, laypersons performed worse when receiving biased advice.  In 
the high/undisclosed condition (called 1BN here, for one expert who is biased 
but with no disclosure), their errors were larger than when relying upon 
unbiased advisors in the accurate condition (called 1UA here)—a difference of 
$1.29, or 36%.72  More interestingly, just as in the CLM study, laypersons with 
biased advisors but no disclosures (1BN) did much better than those who had 
biased advisors who gave mandated disclosures of the conflict (1BC)—a 
difference of $1.64, or 34%.73  All of the point estimates in the present study 
are statistically indistinguishable from those in the CLM study.74
69 See Cain et al., supra note 32, at 13 n.7 (defining virtual error); id. 16 tbl.6 (disclosing estimators’ 
personal estimates). 
70 Still, a more obvious dependent variable would be to measure the absolute value of the difference 
between the layperson’s estimate and the true value, and these results for “actual error” are reported in the 
Appendix.  Following the CLM study, virtual error is instead used in this Article to account for the fact that 
both laypersons and experts systematically underestimated the value of the coins in the jars, and to avoid the 
peculiar finding that the advisor’s upward bias due to a conflicting interest does not harm layperson accuracy, 
but instead helps correct for the natural bias.  When absolute error is analyzed rather than virtual error, both the 
CLM study and the present studies found no statistical difference in layperson performance between those 
with accurate advisors and those with undisclosed conflicted advisors, even though the advisors gave 
significantly more biased advice in the latter condition.  The difference in means is only $0.07 in the present 
study (p = .94).  Although this is certainly a possible circumstance in real-world situations of epistemic 
asymmetry with conflicting interests, this would be a special case, and the study has greater external validity 
once that anomaly is resolved by reference to virtual error instead.  Thus, henceforth this Article simply uses 
layperson inaccuracy as the primary dependent variable, but refers to virtual error in doing so. 
71 Ramal Moonesinghe et al., Most Published Research Findings Are False—But a Little Replication 
Goes a Long Way, 4 PLOS MED. e28 0218, 0218 (2007), http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/ 
fetchObjectAttachment.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0040028&representation=PDF 
(“As part of the scientific enterprise, we know that replication—the performance of another study statistically 
confirming the same hypothesis—is the cornerstone of science and replication of findings is very important 
before any causal inference can be drawn.”). 
72 M1BN = 4.85 (SE = 0.40), M1UA = 3.56 (SE = 0.42), t(80) = 2.20, p = .03, r = .24; see Cain et al., supra
note 32, at 16 tbl.6 (reporting this data from the CLM study); infra Table 1 (providing statistical comparisons). 
73 M1BN = 4.85 (SE = 0.40), M1BC = 6.49 (SE = 0.30), t(157) = -2.93, p < 0.01, r = .23; see Cain et al., 
supra note 32, at 16 tbl.6 (reporting this data from the CLM study); infra Table 1 (providing statistical 
comparisons). 
74 See infra Table 1 (reporting statistical comparisons). 
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As in CLM, a mandatory disclosure policy does not seem to help 
laypersons adjust their reliance on the advice received.  Instead, it may only 
cause the expert advisors to become more biased.75  Policymakers should thus 
be wary about the value of the disclosure mandates as a solution to conflicting 
interests. 
Further study is necessary to understand whether and how to improve 
disclosure policies, and to explore alternative policy mechanisms to help 
laypersons in these situations of epistemic asymmetry and conflicting interests.  
The researcher fielded nine other experimental conditions for this purpose.76
These conditions are discussed in the Parts that follow. 
II. WHEN A DISCLOSURE, OR EVEN A BAN, MIGHT WORK, DEPENDING ON 
RELATIVE EXPERTISE AND DEGREE OF BIAS
A. Measuring Epistemic Asymmetry and Bias 
A layperson–advisor relationship involves two distinct factors that impact 
layperson performance in context-dependent ways.  First is the degree to which 
the advisor has expertise compared to the layperson, and second is the degree 
to which the advisor is subject to biases caused by conflicting interests.  Each 
of these dimensions must be accounted for in policy making and experimental 
design. 
The first factor is the difference between the estimation skills of the 
estimator (given his situation) and the advisor (given her situation); the 
advisor’s comparative expertise is the very reason why the layperson may be 
tempted to place his reliance on the advisor.  Alternatively, this factor could be 
called “epistemic asymmetry.”77  In the law of evidence the notion of being an 
“expert” is defined by a witness having “knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education” that the layperson jurors lack, and which would “assist” the jury 
in deciding the case.78  In some situations, there will be a great disparity 
75 To emphasize, this study does not retest the performance of the advisors (instead only assuming that 
they will perform as they did in the CLM study), but does replicate the findings showing how laypersons react 
to disclosures of conflicted interests. 
76 See infra Table 3. 
77 The term information asymmetry is widely used in economic bargaining theory.  See, e.g., Hadfield et 
al., supra note 15.  Epistemic asymmetry is somewhat broader, since it also includes the skill, experience, 
training, or education that allows a party to make practical sense of the information that may be available to 
that party. 
78 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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between the skills of the layperson and the advisor, who is truly an expert.  In 
other situations, the advisor will have no real epistemic advantage.  For 
example, expert testimony is not necessary to prove that a surgeon should 
remove his instruments and surgical sponges before sewing up a patient.79  As 
the Federal Rule of Evidence 702 Advisory Committee noted: 
There is no more certain test for determining when experts may be 
used than the common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman 
would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible 
degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a 
specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute.80
Epistemic asymmetry is thus a relative measurement. 
The same is true for conflicting interests.  There are two potential concerns 
with conflicting interests—they can create biases in the advice given, and they 
can decrease the layperson’s trust in his advisor, if the bias is disclosed or 
observed.  For now, let us focus on the first problem.81  There will be cases in 
which the conflicted expert has such extreme biases that his opinion will be 
almost worthless, even if he is highly skilled.82  In other cases, the conflicted 
expert will have no discernable biases and thus be quite likely to provide his 
best estimate. 
Thus, expertise and bias are two different dimensions of accuracy.  
Measurement of epistemic asymmetry was not possible given the design of the 
CLM experiment,83 but the present study allows such measurement and thus 
allows more calibrated policy recommendations.  In the present study, 
condition NoAdvisors asked the layperson to perform the estimation task 
without any expert advice at all.  Laypersons in the NoAdvisors condition 
erred by $11.65 on average.84  CLM reports that, in the accurate condition, the 
79 See, e.g., Burke v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 475 F.2d 364, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (explaining that when a 
surgeon leaves his tools in a patient, it “appears to be that rare sort of case in which the type of harm itself 
raises so strong an inference of negligence, and the physician’s duty to prevent the harm is so clear, that expert 
testimony is not required to establish the prevailing standard of care”). 
80 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (quoting Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L.
REV. 414, 418 (1952)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
81 The latter point is explored in Part IV infra.  It is also worth noting that conflicting interests are not the 
only source of biases.  Other biases are beyond the scope of this paper. 
82 See, e.g., In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 627–28, 640 (S.D. Tex. 2005) 
(excluding expert testimony in part because compensation bias was prominent). 
83 Cain et al., supra note 32, at 16 tbl.6 (showing that lack of NoAdvisors condition in the CLM study). 
84 See infra Table 4 (reporting actual errors rather than virtual errors). 
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advisors personally estimated that the jars held $15.62 on average,85 but the 
jars actually held $18.16 on average,86 which means that the experts 
themselves erred by $2.54 on average (the difference).  When one compares 
this $2.54 actual expert error to the $11.65 actual error of laypersons, we can 
compare the expertise of these two actors and see the epistemic asymmetry.  
Dividing these two average actual errors, one can conclude that in this 
experimental setting there is an epistemic asymmetry ratio of 459% between 
experts and laypersons.  The errors of laypersons were more than four times 
the size of those of the unbiased experts. 
One can likewise calculate a “bias ratio” to capture the inaccuracy of the 
advice offered when the advisor has interests aligned with the estimator, 
compared to when those interests are conflicted.  First, to compute the bias 
when interests are aligned, subtract the advisors’ personal estimates ($15.62) in 
the accurate condition from the average proffered advice ($16.48) in that same 
condition; this yields $0.86.87  Second, to compute the bias when interests are 
conflicted, subtract the advisors’ personal estimates in the accurate condition 
(again $15.62) from the average proffered advice in the high/undisclosed 
condition ($20.16); this yields $4.54.88  As one can see, the discrepancy 
between the proffered advice and what advisors actually believe (that is, their 
personal estimates) increases from $0.86 to $4.54, when interests shift from 
aligned to conflicted.  Dividing $4.54 by $0.86, we compute a bias ratio of 
528%, which is the degree to which the inaccuracy of advice increases when 
interests are conflicted rather than aligned.  In other words, in this study, 
advisors with conflicting interests give advice that is more than five times as 
inaccurate as advisors with aligned interests. 
Thus, the CLM study and the present study explore a situation of large 
epistemic asymmetry of 459% and large bias of 528%.  CLM found that a 
disclosure mandate did not help in this setting,89 and this further analysis 
suggests that the reason may be that a layperson who rejected the biased advice 
would be left with his own poor estimates.  Thus, regardless of whether the 
laypersons followed the bad advice or trusted their own bad estimates, the 
85 Cain et al., supra note 32, at 15 tbl.5. 
86 Id. at 14 tbl.4 (averaging across row 1). 
87 See id. at 15 tbl.5.  It is not clear why there was any discrepancy between personal estimates and 
advice given in the condition where interests were aligned.  It is possible that advisors were trying to offset 
systematic errors that they presumed that their estimators might make. 
88 See id.
89 Id. at 6–7. 
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result was unlikely to be very good.  This is the classic “out of the frying pan 
into the fire” sort of problem. 
So, these ratios show that the estimates of the advisor and the layperson 
were both bad, just for different reasons.  In this context, the disclosure 
mandate simply made the problem worse, since it worsened the advice given 
even further.  The disclosure mandate essentially imposed a transaction cost on 
those laypersons who used the disclosure to switch their reliance from the 
advisor to themselves, with no real benefit. 
B. Extrapolating to Real World Conditions to Test Policy Solutions 
Can we generalize from the CLM study?  It is important to emphasize that 
CLM constructed an artificial experiment in which the researchers created 
experts, who actually had privileged epistemic access to the truth (the value of 
coins in a jar).  Yet, in the real world, not every advisor is an expert.  Indeed, 
the CLM setting may be more the exception than the rule.90  So, before 
extrapolating these findings, it would be useful to have a measure of the 
expertise ratio and the bias ratio in the specific setting where a disclosure 
mandate is proposed.  Only if the ratios are comparable to those tested in the 
CLM study should we expect that the laboratory findings will have predictive 
value.  What about real-world situations where “the experts” do not actually 
have much expertise?  Or where the conflicting interests do not actually create 
biases?  This section explores those variations. 
Take the doctor–patient relationship.  Plausibly, one might suppose that the 
epistemic asymmetry in the typical doctor–patient relationship is quite high 
(perhaps more than 459%), given the hard science underlying much of 
medicine, the extensive formal training physicians receive, and their individual 
and collective experience.91  As for the bias ratio, one might hope that the 
90 See generally DAVID H. FREEDMAN, WRONG 7 (2010) (“The fact is, expert wisdom usually turns out to 
be at best highly contested and ephemeral, and at worst flat-out wrong.”). 
91 Carl E. Schneider & Mark A. Hall, The Patient Life: Can Consumers Direct Health Care?, 35 AM. J.
L. & MED. 7, 31–34 (2009).  Still, there are contexts where physicians have very little hard evidence to go on 
and may be proceeding on little more than trial and error.  See, e.g., Kevin A. Kerber & A. Mark Fendrick, The 
Evidence Base for the Evaluation and Management of Dizziness, 16 J. EVALUATION CLINICAL PRAC. 186, 189 
(2010) (“Physicians rely on the medical literature to inform decisions, but our study suggests that the evidence 
base for dizziness evaluation and management is weak.”); Christian Davenport, Doctors Who Prescribe Oft-
Abused Drugs Face Scrutiny, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2011, at A01 (“Doctors ‘don’t get very much, if any, 
training in dependence, in addiction, in pain management’ . . . .” (quoting R. Gil Kerlikowske, Director, White 
House Office of National Drug Control Policy)).  And, evidence suggests that patients are increasingly turning 
to their own epistemic resources (such as WebMD or nontraditional healers), which may make the epistemic 
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professionalism of doctors will minimize the size of the financial biases in 
their advice, making it much smaller than CLM’s observed 528%.  Still, there 
is evidence that doctors (like all humans) respond to incentives, and incentives 
are often misaligned.92  Moreover, even unbiased doctors may render biased 
advice if it is based on scientific findings that are themselves biased by the 
pharmaceutical industry.93
Therefore, in the particular setting of medical practice, CLM’s findings 
may have relevance for policymakers—if the epistemic asymmetry and bias 
ratios are comparable.  In other settings, where the epistemic asymmetry is 
smaller (because the advisors have little relative expertise), and the bias ratio is 
the same or larger (for example, if the advisor has few legal or social 
constraints on exploitive behavior), a disclosure mandate may be salutary.  In 
that context, a disclosure mandate may cause laypersons to reject the biased 
advice and follow their own judgments instead. 
Consider other contexts where it may be tempting to apply CLM’s 
findings.  One might suppose that the epistemic asymmetry in the retail 
stockbroker–investor relationship is relatively low for the task of selecting a 
stock or mutual fund, given the empirical research showing that performance 
of any particular investment is rarely better than random and almost impossible 
to predict.94  Indeed, the efficient market hypothesis suggests that a random 
asymmetry better or even worse, depending on the quality of that information and the layperson’s ability to use 
it.  See, e.g., Lisa Grossman, The Net Doctor Will See You Now, NEW SCIENTIST, July 25, 2009, at 20 
(describing the increasing use of online medical resources in advance or in lieu of seeing a doctor).  In 
principle, this overall asymmetry could be measured, for instance, by asking doctors and laypersons to each 
answer some context-relevant questions for which the answer is objective and scalar.  For example, what is the 
one-year survival rate for patients with a given condition who go untreated?  What is the one-year survival rate 
with the preferred treatment? 
92 See sources cited supra notes 1–5. 
93 See generally In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 69, 106 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“The pervasive 
commercial bias found in today’s research laboratories means studies are often lacking in essential objectivity, 
with the potential for misinformation, skewed results, or cover-ups.”), rev’d in part sub nom. UFCW Local 
1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2010); COMM. ON CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MED. RESEARCH,
EDUC. & PRACTICE, INST. OF MED., CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MEDICAL RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND 
PRACTICE 104 (Bernard Lo & Marilyn J. Field eds., 2009) (“Several systematic reviews and other studies 
provide substantial evidence that clinical trials with industry ties are more likely to have results that favor 
industry.”); Christopher T. Robertson, The Triple Blind: How to Stop Industry Bias in Biomedical Science, 
Without Violating the First Amendment, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. (forthcoming 2011) (reviewing the evidence of 
industry influence in biomedical science). 
94 See Laurent Barras et al., False Discoveries in Mutual Fund Performance: Measuring Luck in 
Estimated Alphas, 65 J. FIN. 179, 181–82 (2010) (examining performance of various mutual funds and finding 
that very few reliably beat the market); Andrew Metrick, Performance Evaluation with Transactions Data: 
The Stock Selection of Investment Newsletters, 54 J. FIN. 1743 (1999) (finding that the stock picks of 
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walk down Wall Street is likely to be just as effective, and surely less 
expensive, than hiring an advisor for advice.95  In that sort of situation, the 
advisor and layperson will do roughly equally well.  Nonetheless, a conflicted 
advisor may exert a strong bias toward frequent trades, churning the account to 
maximize transaction fees.96
Likewise, real estate agents may have a relatively large bias toward 
advising their clients to buy (rather than rent) and pay more for a house, since 
the realtor is only paid upon a sale, and then as a portion of the sales price.97
In these contexts, the bias of a conflicted advisor may be as large or larger than 
the 528% that can be derived from the CLM data.98  Yet, the realtor might have 
very little real expertise for the task of predicting the appropriateness of a 
purchase for a particular family given its own needs and finances, nor will the 
realtor have any advantage in predicting future home prices.99  One 
experimental study tasked both real estate agents and amateurs with appraising 
the market value of real houses, and found that both groups “were significantly 
biased by listing prices,” a factor which seems to beg the question about the 
true value of the house.100  The authors noted that the agents seemed less aware 
of (or less candid about) the role of listing price in their estimates.101  Most 
importantly, the researchers found a “similarity of judgments” by both the 
experts and amateurs, and suggested that in such contexts where there 
appeared to be little epistemic advantage, “we might expect experts to talk a 
better game than amateurs, but to produce (on the average) similar results.”102
investment newsletters fail to outperform the market).  But see Kent L. Womack, Do Brokerage Analysts’ 
Recommendations Have Investment Value?, 51 J. FIN. 137, 137 (1996) (analyzing data and concluding that 
stock “[a]nalysts appear to have market timing and stock picking abilities”). 
95 BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET: THE BEST AND LATEST INVESTMENT 
ADVICE MONEY CAN BUY 24 (1996). But see Joshua D. Coval et al., Can Individual Investors Beat the 
Market? (Harvard Bus. Sch. Fin. Unit Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 04-025, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=364000 (presenting evidence that some skillful individual investors do appear to 
reliably beat the market). 
96 See McCann, supra note 51, at 49; Roni Michaely & Kent L. Womack, Conflict of Interest and the 
Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 653 (1999) (presenting evidence that 
stock analysts are biased by their relationships to the companies they rate). 
97 Mark S. Nadel, A Critical Assessment of the Traditional Residential Real Estate Broker Commission 
Rate Structure (Abridged), 5 CORNELL REAL EST. REV. 26, 33 (2006).
98 See supra text accompanying notes 86–88. 
99 Nadel, supra note 97, at 39–40. 
100 Gregory B. Northcraft & Margaret A. Neale, Experts, Amateurs, and Real Estate: An Anchoring-and-
Adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions, 39 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 84, 95 (1987). 
101 Id.
102 Id. at 95–96. 
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In these contexts, where epistemic asymmetry is low and bias is high, 
CLM’s findings may be inapposite.  A disclosure mandate that informs the 
layperson of the conflicting interest and drives the layperson away from such 
advice may be salutary, especially if it is strengthened in the ways discussed 
below.  The efficacy of a disclosure mandate is thus highly contingent on 
context, as measured by these two ratios.  Indeed, as the epistemic asymmetry 
ratio approaches zero and the bias ratio grows, other policy interventions, such 
as an outright ban on those with conflicted interests providing advice, will 
become more salutary.  If the conflicting interests cause large biases, but the 
advisor has very little epistemic advantages anyway, then the net advice is 
unlikely to be helpful. 
The NoAdvisors condition shows that this is definitely not the case under 
the present experimental design borrowed from CLM.  When the layperson has 
no advisors at all, the layperson errs by $9.76 on average, which is much worse 
than the $6.49 error in condition 1BC, where a layperson is given advice from 
one expert with a bias and a disclosure of conflicting interests.103  Indeed, the 
errors in the NoAdvisor condition are significantly worse than any other 
condition.  Under this experimental setting, biased advice is much better than 
nothing. 
This huge difference in layperson performance suggests that in contexts of 
epistemic asymmetry that are similar to the one tested here, it may be much 
more important to ensure that laypersons have some advice than it is to worry 
about whether that advice is biased (or not) or whether that bias is disclosed (or 
not).  For example, in some regions in the United States, there is a severe 
shortage of primary care physicians, and thus many laypersons are not getting 
the preventative care they need.104  Such persons may not be receiving efficient 
and necessary treatments such as prescription statins, which are shown not 
only to help patients but also to reduce net health care costs.105  One could 
imagine a policy in which the pharmaceutical companies that manufactured 
statins sent their own health care professionals into underserved areas with the 
103 MNoAdvisor = 9.76 (SE = 0.44), M1BC = 6.49 (SE = 0.30), t(156) = 5.7, p < .001, r = .42; see infra Table 
3. 
104 Howard K. Rabinowitz et al., Critical Factors for Designing Programs to Increase the Supply and 
Retention of Rural Primary Care Physicians, 286 JAMA 1041, 1041 (2001) (“The shortage of primary care 
physicians in rural areas has been one of the most intractable US health policy problems of the past century.”). 
105 Sheila Leatherman et al., The Business Case for Quality: Case Studies and an Analysis, 22 HEALTH 
AFF. 17, 20 (2003) (“Taking into account the clinical research literature on statins and statistical estimates of 
the longer-term costs of repeat heart attacks, the estimated ratio of cost to savings for effective treatment would 
be approximately 1:2.”). 
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express goal of prescribing the drug, likely being biased in their decision 
making and thus overprescribing the drug compared to the optimal level.  In 
such a context, if the cost of over-prescribing because of biased advice is less 
than the cost of underprescribing for lack of advice, policymakers might 
rationally prefer that laypersons receive such biased advice. 
A ban on conflicted advice, on the other hand, can be dangerous in some 
contexts and helpful in others.  Generally, where epistemic asymmetry is high, 
a ban on conflicted advice would be very bad policy, unless the policymaker 
can be confident that non-conflicted advisors would replace the conflicted 
advisors.  Such replacement is not an obvious outcome of a ban on conflicted 
advice.  To the extent that an advisor has a conflicting interest, the advisory 
services are being subsidized by some outside source.106  Once that subsidy is 
removed by a ban policy, the layperson may no longer be able to afford the 
services of the advisor, who may instead find more lucrative work elsewhere.  
The conflict of interest may also be a function of the same relationship that 
creates the epistemic expertise.  “For example, many both inside and outside 
the accounting industry have argued that an auditing firm is better equipped to 
handle a client’s complex accounting tasks when the auditor also has deep 
consulting ties to that client.”107  Thus, policymakers must ask whether the 
asymmetry is greater than the bias ratio, and whether there is a viable 
alternative epistemic and economic relationship.
III. MAKING DISCLOSURES WORK BETTER THROUGH ANCHORING,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, AND PERSONALIZATION
Not all mandatory disclosures are created equal.  This Part explores three 
potential ways to improve the efficacy of disclosures.  First, policymakers 
might manipulate when disclosures are given, whether before or after the 
substantive advice.  Second, policymakers might attempt to improve the type 
of disclosures given, to better enable laypersons to calibrate their advice.  
Third, policymakers can pay closer attention to who needs to receive 
disclosures, so as to maximize the benefits and minimize the harms of 
disclosure.
106 William M. Sage, Some Principles Require Principals: Why Banning “Conflicts of Interest” Won’t 
Solve Incentive Problems in Biomedical Research, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1413, 1448–49 (2007). 
107 Moore et al., supra note 16, at 11. 
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A. When to Disclose 
Prior behavioral research has shown that persons utilize an “anchor-and-
adjust heuristic” to make decisions, one that is susceptible to undue influence 
from an initial prompt even after subsequent information is received.108  If 
advice is provided first and a disclosure provided thereafter (as in CLM), the 
layperson may anchor on the bad advice before learning that it is unreliable.  
CLM speculated that such an anchoring problem may be a reason that 
disclosures fail.109  Yet, this is a contingency that can be changed.  I 
hypothesized that a disclosure mandate may work to improve layperson 
performance if the disclosure is given before rather than after the substantive 
advice.  Condition 1BCF (one biased advisor with a conflict disclosed first)
tests this hypothesis against condition 1BC, by simply putting the disclosure 
before the advice.  This change does appear to reduce the laypersons’ errors by 
about $0.24 in the experimental sample, but one cannot reliably extrapolate 
such findings since the estimate is far from statistically significant.110
Nonetheless, one might further hypothesize that the anchoring effect will 
be strongest during the layperson’s first estimation task, and that as he 
proceeds through the second through sixth estimation tasks (recall that there 
were six jars), he has internalized the information, and thus performs quite like 
those in the control group of 1BC.  This dilution effect would not occur in one-
off transactions, and thus the current intervention may still have policy 
relevance for such situations. 
This new hypothesis can be tested by examining only the laypersons’ 
estimates on the first jar in the 1BC condition versus the first jar of the 1BCF 
condition.  Indeed, when the disclosure is put first in 1BCF, layperson 
inaccuracy was improved by $1.06 (p = 0.04).111  The more precise hypothesis 
is thus confirmed, and this evidence suggests that disclosure policies should, 
where practicable, target laypersons before they receive substantive advice 
from conflicted advisors.  Disclosures seem to work better as a prophylactic 
than as a remedy. 
108 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 
SCIENCE 1124, 1128–30 (1974). 
109 Cain et al., supra note 32, at 6. 
110 M1BCF = 6.25 (SE = 0.30), M1BC = 6.49 (SE = 0.30), t(228) = -0.57, p = .57.  After initially finding a 
similar result, the researcher deployed conditions 1BC and 1BCF again in order to reduce the odds of 
incorrectly affirming the null hypothesis, thus resulting in double-sized samples.  Even after these 
extraordinary efforts, the finding is far from significant. 
111 M1BCF-Jar1 = 4.57 (SE = 0.28), M1BC-Jar1 = 5.63 (SE = 0.41), t(228) = -2.11, p = .04, r = .11. 
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Nonetheless, this finding should be put in the context of condition 1BN, 
where there was one biased expert, with no disclosure given at all.  For the first 
jars in 1BN, laypersons erred by $4.28 on average, which is statistically 
indistinguishable compared to a disclosure-first policy ($0.29 difference, p = 
0.6).112  Thus, putting disclosures first seemed to help ameliorate the problems 
with disclosure mandates in this experimental setting, but disclosure mandates 
were still worse than doing nothing about conflicting interests.  An improved 
disclosure mandate thus appears to be a poor policy response to conflicts of 
interests, in this particular epistemic setting.  Such a mandate seems to do 
nothing more than paper over a real problem for laypersons. 
B. What to Disclose 
Consider another method for improving the efficacy of disclosures.  The 
CLM authors recognized that a disclosure of conflicting interests may not be 
particularly helpful to laypersons, because it does not provide information 
about whether the advisor is actually biased in her advice and, if so, to what 
degree.113  Indeed, in 1BC (as in the CLM study), laypersons were merely told, 
“Note: The advisor is paid based on how HIGH you are in estimating the worth 
of the jar of coins.”114  Laypersons were left to speculate about how these 
interests actually impacted the advice given.  In principle, this need not be the 
case; at least in some contexts, policymakers could provide better information 
to laypersons.  This could be a practicable policy solution in the information 
age, where massive datasets and statistical methods may allow a regulator to 
monitor the behaviors of conflicted versus non-conflicted advisors (whether 
physicians, stockbrokers, or mortgage brokers), with resolution at a group level 
or perhaps individual level.  Indeed, pharmaceutical companies already use 
such “datamining” techniques to customize their marketing efforts to low-
prescribing and high-prescribing doctors.115  Several states, and now the 
federal government, are developing databases of which physicians have 
relationships with pharmaceutical and device companies.116  If such behavioral 
information were collected by a regulator, paired with conflicts information, 
analyzed in a useful way, and passed along to the laypersons who rely upon 
112 M1BN-Jar1 = 4.28 (SE = 0.50), M1BCF-Jar1 = 4.57 (SE = 0.28), t(155) = -0.53, p = .60. 
113 Cain et al., supra note 32, at 20–21. 
114 Id. at 10. 
115 Robert Post, Prescribing Records and the First Amendment—New Hampshire’s Data–Mining Statute,
360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 745, 745 (2009). 
116 Weintraub, supra note 29. 
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conflicted advisors, it would thereby allow the layperson to more precisely 
discount the advice given.
Notably, such a policy mandating disclosures of bias may have different 
effects on the advisors’ behavior than a policy that merely requires disclosure 
of conflicting interests.  Advisors may not even know that they are biased by 
their conflicting interests.117  If advisors were simply told this information, 
then the social norming literature would suggest that the advisors might then 
change their behavior toward the norm.118  Imagine, for example, that hospitals 
in McAllen, Texas, and other extremely high-cost regions were required to 
disclose to their patients that, even controlling for population health, they 
charge more than twice as much per person as other hospitals, yet the quality 
of care and patient outcomes are statistically indistinguishable from that of 
other hospitals.  One might suppose that this sort of mandate would cause the 
physicians and other advisors to improve their behavior, so as to reduce or 
eliminate the need for such embarrassing admissions in the future.  In 
principle, this sort of intervention could completely ameliorate the advisor-side 
problem with disclosures.  On the other hand, one might hypothesize that this 
data would simply provide advisors with even more “moral license” to give 
even more biased advice, as CLM observed with regular disclosures of 
conflicting interests.119  Perhaps this would be caveat emptor taken to the 
extreme.  Resolving these competing hypotheses would be a fruitful avenue for 
future study.  In any case, the present experiment does not measure the 
advisors’ performance under this condition, but instead merely uses the advisor 
behavioral data from CLM’s high disclosed condition, thus tacitly assuming 
that there would be no difference in advisor behavior. 
Condition 1BCB (one biased advisor, with a disclosure of both the conflict 
and the average size of bias) tests this hypothesis, focusing just on how the 
strengthened disclosure would impact laypersons.  In addition to a disclosure 
of conflicting interests (as in 1BC), condition 1BCB provides laypersons with 
more concrete information about the size of the conflicted expert’s bias (rather 
than merely his conflicted interests).  Specifically, in this condition, the 
117 Moore et al., supra note 16, at 11 (“We argue . . . that doctors’ advice is biased . . . and that they 
typically believe their biased advice is unbiased.”); see also Gawande, supra note 1, at 40 (discussing how 
health care providers with a bias toward high-cost procedures treat patients without realizing the bias). 
118 See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 930, 949 (1996) 
(considering how choices are based upon beliefs about facts, and how the communication of accurate facts can 
therefore change beliefs based on inaccurate facts). 
119 See discussion supra Part II. 
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experimenters told the subjects that “prior research has shown that advisors 
paid in this way tend to give advice that is $7.68 higher on average than the 
advice of advisors who are paid based on accuracy.”  This was a true 
statement, based on the data reported in CLM120 and the prompts used in the 
present experiment. 
Compare condition 1BCB against condition 1BC on the dependent variable 
of layperson accuracy.  The addition of an average bias disclosure did not help 
layperson accuracy on average (but may have actually worsened it by $0.46 on 
average, although this is statistically insignificant, p = 0.47).121  The hypothesis 
is rejected—a disclosure of the conflicted advisors’ average level of actual bias 
does not appear to help the average accuracy of laypersons that rely upon those 
advisors.  Another condition, 1BCBF, further suggests that it makes little 
difference when this bias information is disclosed, whether first, before the 
substantive advice, or thereafter.  Like condition 1BCB, condition 1BCBF 
provided laypersons with disclosures about average advisor bias, but did so 
first, before providing the advisor’s substantive advice.  The slight 
improvement of $0.21 over 1BCB is not significant (p = 0.81).122  Thus, the 
hypothesis that disclosing actual bias will help laypersons discount optimally 
must be rejected. 
Although laypersons could have simply subtracted $7.68 from the advice 
they received, and thereby calculated (and used) the same advice received by 
laypersons with unbiased advisors (on average), they apparently did not do so.  
Why did this intervention fail?  Participants were allowed to answer an 
optional final question, providing open-ended feedback on the study or 
describing their tactics, and some of the answers are relevant to this point.  
Although a few participants said, “I pretty much just subtracted the $7.00,” as 
one would hope and expect, others receiving this bias disclosure said, “I pretty 
much ignored the adviser, they seemed like they were way off, and knowing 
they were biased meant there was no reason to take their word.”123  A 
significant number of respondents used the bias disclosure not as a mechanism 
120 See Cain et al., supra note 32, at 15 tbl.5. 
121 M1BCB = 6.95 (SE = 0.64), M1BC = 6.49 (SE = 0.30), t(170) = 0.73, p = .47. 
122 M1BCBF = 6.74 (SE = 0.55), MBCB = 6.95 (SE = 0.64), t(120) = -.247, p = .81. 
123 A third subgroup of respondents in 1BCB and 1BCBF seems to have actually been misled by the 
disclosure of bias and provided even higher raw guesses than in the 1BC condition, drawing the average guess 
higher.  Other than sheer confusion, or a failure to communicate clearly, no obvious hypothesis explains why 
this might happen.  The increased standard deviation that comes with an average bias disclosure (3.28 in 1BC 
to 4.79 in 1BCB) suggests that there is more than simply a shift in means occurring in this data. 
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of calibrating their reliance more precisely, but rather as a strengthened 
warning suggesting that the advice is altogether worthless.  Given the high 
levels of epistemic asymmetry in this experiment (measured in the prior Part), 
the tactic of ignoring the proffered advice turns out to be a very poor idea.  
Still, the findings in the prior section suggest that a specific bias disclosure 
may be more fruitful in contexts of low epistemic asymmetry (such as stock 
broker–client relationships or realtor–buyer relationships), as it would drive 
laypersons away from advice that had very little value in the first place.  This 
deserves further study, in various epistemic contexts. 
To disaggregate these trends, let us create a benchmark for layperson 
success in this task.  Suppose that condition 1UA presents a decent benchmark 
for success, since it provides laypersons with one unbiased advisor and a 
statement that interests are aligned.  The researcher constructed a proportional 
metric representing the percentage of participants in each condition whose 
guesses were as good or better than the $2.72 benchmark error of a median 
respondent in the 1UA condition.  Let us stipulate that the participants more or 
less “succeeded” in the estimation task, if their inaccuracy was no worse than 
the laypersons’ in the 1UA condition.  By definition, 50% of the participants in 
1UA performed at or better than their own median, but when the disclosed 
conflict is added in 1BC, only 11% exceeded the benchmark for success.  
However, when a policymaker added a mandate for disclosure of actual 
average bias in 1BCB, the “successes” increased to 21%.  We have nearly 
doubled the number of successes.124  As a matter of public policy, this could be 
a worthwhile investment, if it doubled successes, helping laypersons to 
overcome a given threshold and make better decisions (e.g., rejecting the 
gallbladder surgery recommended by their conflicted surgeon where there is no 
proven marginal efficacy). 
The conclusions here are very tentative.  It may be worthwhile to further 
pursue the concept of mandating disclosures of biased advisor behavior, 
perhaps with special attention to making the information useable to the 
laypersons who must rely upon it, so as to minimize confusion and maximize 
their ability to integrate the additional information into their process of 
weighing the advice against their own epistemic priors.  At the end of the day, 
124 This result is marginally significant at traditional levels.  Using a chi-squared test comparing 1BC with 
1BCB, 2(1) = 3.18, p = .06.  When 1BCB is combined with the statistically indistinguishable 1BCBF (where 
the only difference is that the disclosures are provided first, before the advice) and then compared with 1BC, 
the difference in success rates is significant, 2(1) = 3.82, p = .04; the odds of “success” were 1.98 times higher 
in the (combined) 1BCB+1BCBF condition than in the 1BC condition. 
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this intervention may have a distributive effect, helping the savviest laypersons 
weigh the information they receive, but harming others who react poorly to the 
additional information.  These effects may depend in part on the degree of 
epistemic asymmetry (i.e., relative expertise) in a given context.  As discussed 
above, only in situations of high epistemic asymmetry will it be worrisome for 
a policy to drive a wedge between a layperson and her advisor.  And, as 
discussed further below, in a robust marketplace for advice, a disclosure of 
bias may have the salutary effect of driving laypersons to better advisors—a 
choice that laypersons did not have in the present experimental conditions.  
The concept of bias disclosures (rather than conflict disclosures) thus deserves 
further study in other experimental and policy settings. 
C. To Whom to Disclose 
Consider a third potential way to improve disclosure mandates: by tailoring 
them to individual persons who need them while withholding them from 
laypersons who could only be harmed by them.  Consider the likely real-world 
contexts in which a conflicting interest exists but some advisors remain 
unbiased—they do not change the advice that they give to some or all of their 
layperson clients, compared to the advice they would have given but for the 
conflict.  Heterogeneity arises at two levels: (1) that of the individual advisors 
and (2) that of the individual laypersons who rely upon them.   
First, advisors’ professionalism—their technical training and ethical 
commitments—may prevent some of them from suffering biases, even when 
they have conflicting interests.125  Even if the mean advice differs between 
conflicted advisors and non-conflicted advisors (as CLM reported, and we 
assume here), the distributions of the two groups are likely to overlap, such 
that a significant portion of the conflicted advisors will perform as well or 
better than the median non-conflicted advisor.  The mere fact that an expert is 
conflicted does not necessarily imply that his advice is biased.126
The phenomenon repeats at the level of the individual layperson clients 
within each advisor.  Even within the biased advisors, only some of their 
125 See Robertson, supra note 47, at 193–95 (discussing the ways in which professionalism constrains the 
biases of experts, albeit imperfectly). 
126 See, e.g., Pretty v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 696 F. Supp. 2d 170, 189 (D. Conn. 2010) (“The mere 
fact that Prudential retained the medical experts to review the Plaintiff’s file does not make their opinions 
unreasonable.  The Plaintiff has also failed to provide any evidence of a history of biased claims administration 
by Prudential.” (citation omitted)). 
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clients will receive biased advice compared to what they would have received 
from an unbiased advisor.  This ratio will be particularly low where the advisor 
provides a binary sort of advice, as is often the case.  For example, a doctor 
may advise either treatment S (surgery) or treatment L (lifestyle changes).  
Even if such an advisor becomes biased, this will just increase the frequency 
with which he gives the favored advice (S).  Without the conflicting interest, a 
given doctor may have prescribed the surgery to 70% of his clients presenting 
with a given condition, but after succumbing to the bias, he then prescribes it 
to 85% of his clients.  For most of the clients (aside from the marginal 15%), 
the substantive advice will be the same in either case, but the advice will now 
be accompanied by a warning about conflicting interests.   
To simulate the performance of that majority group, participants in 
condition 1UC each received one unbiased advisor (as in 1UA) but a 
disclosure of conflicting interests (as in 1BC).  As one might hypothesize, 
these laypersons suffered from the disclosure, having errors $1.21 larger on 
average than those in condition 1UA (p = 0.049).127  Thus, these findings 
illustrate how, in the real-world settings of doctors’ offices and mortgage 
brokerages, a disclosure mandate may often drive laypersons away from 
perfectly good advice.  This is an important finding, identifying and 
demonstrating another way that disclosures may be deleterious to the people 
that they are designed to help. 
From the perspective of layperson welfare, this is another piece of evidence 
that suggests that disclosure mandates are poor solutions for the problem of 
conflicting interests.  The real solution would try to eliminate the conflicts in 
the first place.  Still, if we continue to rely on disclosure mandates at all, as 
seems inevitable, it may then be best to narrow disclosure mandates to only 
those situations where we have some reason to believe that a particular advisor 
or set of advisors is actually biased (not merely exposed to a potential bias 
arising from a conflicted interest).  Even better, we would further limit 
disclosure to those particular laypersons who are receiving the marginal advice 
that is different from what would have been given but for the bias.  For 
example, as discussed above, there are extreme geographic disparities in health 
care costs across the United States, with health care providers in some regions 
charging for twice as many procedures compared to others, with no discernable 
improvement in quality.128  In principle, a disclosure mandate could target only 
127 M1UC = 4.77 (SE = 0.42), M1UA = 3.56 (SE = 0.42), t(90) = 2.00, p = .049, r = .21. 
128 Orszag & Ellis, supra note 5, at 1794–95. 
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the regions or institutions where costs are highest, where regulators expect that 
it is most likely that patients are suffering from biased advice.  Thus, any 
benefits of a disclosure mandate can be captured without imposing the costs 
identified here.  Or more particularly, depending on the resolution of the data, 
the mandate could be tailored to individual hospitals or even individual 
doctors. 
In principle, targeted disclosures can work at the patient level.  Scholars 
have found that doctors tend to practice quite similarly when the evidence and 
national guidelines are clear, but in some regions they exhibit biases for higher 
cost care when they make decisions under greater uncertainty.129  Thus, to the 
extent that such situations can be identified ex ante, a disclosure mandate could 
be required for those situations but not others.  As Margaret Johns has 
proposed, regulators could require physicians to disclose conflicts of interest 
when they write off-label prescriptions, but the regulators need not require 
disclosures when conflicted doctors prescribe on-label or in accordance with 
national practice guidelines.130
Putting aside this possibility of narrowly tailored disclosure mandates, the 
bottom-line finding of condition 1UC is important to emphasize.  For another 
reason, crude disclosure mandates can be deleterious to the laypersons they are 
designed to help.  Putting autonomy-based arguments aside, policymakers 
concerned with patient welfare should be careful not to force disclosures of 
conflicting interests unless they have credible evidence that the conflict 
actually causes a bias for the layperson, and evidence that the disclosure will 
make things better.131  Furthermore, if they have such evidence of actual bias, 
the disclosure mandate should be tailored as narrowly as possible to specific 
groups of advisors and laypersons.  Then, as discussed in Part III.B, the 
129 Brenda E. Sirovich et al., Regional Variations in Health Care Intensity and Physician Perceptions of 
Quality of Care, 144 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 641, 646 n.2, 648 (2006) (examining how doctors with poor 
communication with patients, restrictions upon autonomy, and a perceived scarcity of resources result in a 
higher cost of care). 
130 Johns, supra note 26, at 971.  The FDA apparently prohibits physicians with industry ties from 
promoting a drug for an off-label use but allows industry-tied physicians to prescribe a drug for off-label use.  
See Conko, supra note 37, at 15. 
131 A fair question arises about the default rule.  It may be a decent assumption that wherever there is a 
conflict of interest there is probably a bias in the aggregate advice rendered.  The argument of this section has 
merely sought to show that there is a heterogeneity of advisors and a heterogeneity of laypersons, such that a 
statement about the aggregate cannot reliably be applied to each piece of advice individually.  Such 
generalization would be an example of the ecological fallacy.  See generally GARY KING, A SOLUTION TO THE 
ECOLOGICAL INFERENCE PROBLEM 3–17 (1997) (discussing ecological inferences and the ecological fallacy). 
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evidence of bias should perhaps be provided to laypersons themselves so that 
they can better assess the advice that they receive. 
IV. CALIBRATING RELIANCE IN A MARKET FOR ADVICE
Part III explored ways to improve the efficacy of disclosure mandates.  
Even with such improvements, however, disclosures are likely to remain a 
suboptimal, or at least incomplete, solution for the fundamental problem of 
biased advice.  One remaining hypothesis, not tested by CLM or the foregoing 
experimental conditions, is that disclosures may help laypersons choose 
amongst multiple conflicted and non-conflicted advisors if there is something 
like a market for advice.  This Part applies several new experimental 
conditions to explore laypersons’ baseline assumptions about advice, and 
whether affirmative disclosures may improve reliance and performance when 
interests are aligned.  This Part also introduces several conditions in which 
laypersons are given multiple biased and unbiased advisors, with and without 
conflicting interests.  Finally, by assessing the correlation between layperson 
confidence and performance, this Part concludes that market-based solutions 
are likely insufficient.  Laypersons appear to have little self-awareness about 
their marginal performance with or without biased advisors, which thus makes 
more aggressive regulatory interventions appropriate. 
A. Affirmative Disclosures of Aligned Interests 
Almost two decades ago, scholars in biomedical ethics were already 
identifying a crisis in trust—patients had reduced their degree of reliance on 
their health care providers, to the detriment of both the patients’ health 
outcomes and the esteem of the medical profession.132  In dentistry, for 
example, the fee-for-service relationship creates deep conflicting interests, and 
there is even less oversight by insurers and government payors.133  Dentists 
have begun to worry about polling data showing that the U.S. public trusts 
their honesty and ethics at a rate lower than that of nurses, pharmacists, and 
physicians.134  The longer dentists have practiced, the more they are conscious 
132 Edmund D. Pellegrino, Trust and Distrust in Professional Ethics, in ETHICS, TRUST, AND THE 
PROFESSIONS 69, 77–78 (Edmund D. Pellegrino et al. eds., 1991). 
133 See, e.g., United States v. Talbott, 590 F.2d 192, 195–96 (6th Cir. 1978) (upholding rare convictions 
for mail fraud for unnecessary dental procedures). 
134 Barry Schwartz et al., Perceptions About Conflicts of Interest: An Ontario Survey of Dentists’ 
Opinions, 71 J. DENTAL EDUC. 1540, 1540, 1548 (2007). 
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of the problems created by their conflicting interests.135  Such lack of trust may 
mean that skeptical patients forego needed dental work. 
Some scholars have suggested that disclosure policies may be part of the 
solution to this problem of diminishing trust in professional advisors.136  Kevin 
Weinfurt, for example, hypothesized that in contexts of high epistemic 
asymmetry (as here), where a layperson does have an advisor whose interests 
are aligned, a disclosure of that fact may help the layperson become more 
accurate by making the layperson more trusting.137  Condition 1UN of this 
study, which had one unbiased advisor but no such disclosure, was designed to 
test this hypothesis against condition 1UA, where there was also one unbiased 
advisor and laypersons were told, “Note: The advisor is paid based on how 
accurate the estimator is in estimating the worth of the jar of coins,” as in 
CLM’s accurate condition.138
The results were positive, showing that such an affirmative disclosure of 
aligned interests in 1UA improves layperson performance by $1.15 on average 
compared to the agnostic 1UN (p = 0.05).139  This finding demonstrates that in 
our experimental setting at least, laypersons were naturally rather untrusting of 
the advice that came with epistemic advantages but without any information 
about incentives.  The information about the advisors’ aligned incentives 
seemed to overcome this natural distrust and increased reliance accordingly. 
This condition also allows us to isolate the effect of a disclosure of 
conflicting interests, while holding the substantive advice constant.  Let us 
construct a measure of the layperson’s degree of reliance on the expert’s 
advice, defined as the difference between the advice given and the estimate 
rendered.  The larger that difference, the less the layperson appears to be 
relying upon the expert.  In 1UA (where there was an unbiased advisor and a 
disclosure of aligned interests), laypersons’ estimates were on average $3.64 
away from the advice given, while those receiving a conflicts disclosure in 
1UC were on average $5.15 away from the advice given, a difference of $1.51 
(p = 0.02).140  In 1UN (where the unbiased advice was the same but there was 
135 Id. at 1548. 
136 Kevin P. Weinfurt et al., Disclosing Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research: Views of Institutional 
Review Boards, Conflict of Interest Committees, and Investigators, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 581, 581, 585 
(2006). 
137 Id. at 581–83. 
138 Cain et al., supra note 32, at 10. 
139 M1UN = 4.71 (SE = 0.38), M1UA = 3.56 (SE = 0.42), t(89) = 2.00, p = .049, r = .21. 
140 M1UA = 3.64 (SE = 0.46), M1UC = 5.15 (SE = 0.45), t(90) = -2.30, p = .02, r = .24. 
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no information about the advisor’s incentives provided), the layperson on 
average provided estimates that were $4.94 away from the advice given.  Thus, 
when no incentives information is provided, as in 1UN, laypersons seem to 
behave almost exactly the same as when a conflict is disclosed, as in 1UC (a 
difference of $0.21, p = 0.74).141  This is quite surprising, given that the 
experiment provided no prompting at all that would suggest that the advisor 
may have a conflicting interest or any motives whatsoever other than truth.  
Nonetheless, the disclosure that interests were aligned in 1UA improved 
reliance and accuracy significantly. 
Thus, in real-world settings where advisors and clients have aligned 
interests, a disclosure mandate may help laypersons properly increase their 
reliance.  Of course, if greater reliance is in the advisor’s own interests, a 
mandate may be unnecessary.  However, it is also possible that social norms or 
sheer habit will prevent overt discussion of the advisor’s incentives.  This 
failure is especially likely where the policy regime has not yet focused 
attention on those incentive structures.  Thus a disclosure mandate policy, 
designed to help laypersons with conflicted advisors, may have spillover 
benefits to even those with non-conflicted advisors.  This finding also holds 
promise for policies that explicitly attempt to align the incentives of advisors 
and laypersons, suggesting that laypersons would be quite appreciative of such 
reforms and that their behavior would exploit such an improvement, if they 
learned about it. 
B. Using Disclosures to Select Advisors 
A significant limitation of the CLM study was that laypersons receiving 
disclosures about conflicts had nowhere else to turn for advice.  Each 
layperson had a single advisor, who essentially had a monopoly on the market 
for advice.  If the layperson did not trust her advisor’s opinion, she could only 
resort to her own inferior estimates.  Instead, as CLM acknowledged but did 
not test,142 one might hypothesize that a disclosure mandate will be salutary to 
laypersons when there are multiple biased and unbiased advisors available 
because it helps the laypersons decide where to place their reliance.  Indeed, 
this selection effect may be the most important function of a disclosure 
mandate in real-world settings. 
141 M1UN = 4.94 (SE = 0.44), M1UC = 5.15 (SE = 0.45), t(103) = -0.33, p = .74. 
142 Cain et al., supra note 32, at 21–22. 
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This logic seems to be the assumption behind rules that allow an advisor to 
proceed with a conflicting interest, as long as that interest is first disclosed to 
the client and the client gives informed consent.143  As formal models predict, 
this layperson-choice dynamic might also then create an incentive for the 
expert to either eliminate the conflicting interests or credibly demonstrate to 
the potential layperson clients that he is nonetheless unbiased.144  On the other 
hand, in specific contexts, such as the conflict created by attorney referral fees, 
scholars have argued that a ban may be more efficient than a disclosure 
mandate.145  States are experimenting with both approaches,146 but there would 
seem to be little means of assessing the success of these natural experiments. 
The present laboratory experiment does not test the ex ante effects on 
advisors, but it does test the possibility of ex post benefits of disclosure 
mandates to laypersons in multi-advisor settings.  Conditions 2N and 2D each 
have two advisors per layperson, one of whom is biased by a conflicting 
interest.  In 2D, but not 2N, a disclosure mandate is imposed, which worsens 
the advice of that advisor (as in CLM) but provides valuable information to the 
layperson.  Thus, we have something like two miniature markets for advice, 
with a variety of both conflicted and non-conflicted advisors, and in one setting 
there is a disclosure mandate.  Still, it is notable that, unlike a true market, the 
second opinion was automatically provided without imposing the cost thereof 
on the layperson. 
Here, unlike in CLM’s single-advisor experiment, the disclosure mandate 
has significant salutary results for the laypersons, improving accuracy by $1.22 
(p = 0.02).147  On net, the advice received in the disclosure condition was 
worse than in the undisclosed condition, but the laypersons did not blindly 
average them.  Apparently, the laypersons effectively used the conflicted 
143 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmts. 18–19 (2010). 
144 Joel Sobel, A Theory of Credibility, 52 REV. ECON. STUD. 557, 557–58, 570 (1985). 
145 John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Conflicts of Interest in Lawyer Referral Arrangements with 
Nonlawyer Professionals, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 197, 235 n.181 (2008). 
146 Id. at 208 n.71, 210 n.79. 
147 M2N = 3.97 (SE = 0.42), M2D = 2.75 (SE = 0.27), t(108) = 2.43, p = .02, r = .23.  As will be explained 
further below, there is also an effect for simply providing two advisors rather than one.  If you compare 1BC 
against 2D—that is, one versus two advisors, with disclosures in both—estimators with two advisors do much 
better, M2D = 2.74 (SE = 0.27), M1BC = 6.49 (SE = 0.30), t(98) = 1.47, p < .001, r = .15.  Interestingly though, 
there is no significant difference between using one versus two advisors if there is no disclosure (that is, 
comparing 1BN against 2N), M2N = 3.97 (SE = 0.42), M1BN = 2.65 (SE = 0.40), t(98) = 1.47, p = .14.  In short 
then, with one conflicted advisor, laypersons do better with no disclosure, but with one conflicted and one non-
conflicted advisor, they do better with disclosure.  This interaction reaffirms the point that a disclosure is only 
useful to laypersons if laypersons have somewhere else to turn for advice. 
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advisors’ disclosures to place their reliance on the non-conflicted advisors.  
Thus, when laypersons have access to non-conflicted advisors, a disclosure 
may be salutary. 
C. The Value of Second Opinions 
For policymakers then, a primary challenge is to get non-conflicted 
advisors to the laypersons who need them.  One such mechanism is 
exemplified by regulations that mandate that patients or mortgage borrowers 
get second opinions before acting on the advice of conflicted advisors.148  Is a 
second-opinion an antidote to biased advice, or are more radical remedies 
(such as a ban on the biased advice) necessary? 
Comparing condition 2D with 1BC allows one to test such “second-
opinion” policies.  Laypersons receive biased advice with a disclosed conflict 
in each condition, but in 2D, the layperson also receives a “second opinion” 
from an unbiased advisor.  This intervention dramatically improves layperson 
performance by 53% (a difference of $3.47, p < 0.001).149  This is one of the 
starkest differences in layperson performance reported in this study.  Indeed, 
this 2D condition becomes the new gold standard for layperson accuracy, 
marginally improving on even condition 1UA (CLM’s “accurate”), where a 
single advisor has aligned incentives for accuracy (a difference by $0.81, 
nearly significant, p = 0.09).150
One might worry that second-opinion policies will be limited in their 
effectiveness if the layperson anchors on the first advice received and does not 
sufficiently adjust his estimate upon receiving the new advice.151  Further 
experimental research, described in the footnotes, explores and rejects this 
hypothesis.152
148 See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text. 
149 M2D = 2.74 (SE = 0.27), M1BC = 6.49 (SE = 0.30), t(98) = 1.47, p < .001, r = .15.
150 M1UA = 3.56 (SE = 0.42), M2D = 2.75 (SE = 0.27), t(90) = 1.70, p = .09, r = .18.  How can adding a 
biased-disclosed advisor (as in 2D) improve performance over simply receiving advice from an advisor with 
aligned incentives (as in 1UA)?  It may be that the two pieces of advice were relatively coherent, compared to 
the layperson’s own estimate (which we know from condition NoAdvisors is much further from the truth).  
Thus the biased, disclosed opinion communicated a rough scale of the epistemic asymmetry to the layperson, 
helping her to place closer reliance on the unbiased expert’s advice.  This effect may be peculiar to settings of 
high epistemic asymmetry and relatively low bias ratios. 
151 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 108. 
152 Condition 2DR was designed to test the hypothesis that laypersons would anchor on the first advice 
received.  Condition 2DR is identical to condition 2D, except that the order of advisors is reversed, so that the 
layperson first receives advice from an advisor with aligned incentives (and a disclosure of the same) and then 
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Notably, the experiment assumed that the biased advisor would perform the 
same as he would under a condition of mandatory disclosure alone.  In the real 
world, if a biased advisor knows that the layperson would likely receive a 
second opinion from an unbiased advisor, the biased advisor may perform 
differently, perhaps improving the advice she gave, making the net 
effectiveness of this policy even better.  Future studies should test this potential 
improvement in advisor behavior. 
The most important policy-relevant conclusion remains: the clearest 
remedy to the epistemic asymmetry with conflicting interests is to (a) force 
disclosures of the conflicts, but only if we also (b) ensure that laypersons also 
have access to, and actually use, non-conflicted advisors.  Non-conflicted 
advisors are a complete antidote to conflicted advisors.  Of course, second 
opinions have costs—someone must pay that second advisor to repeat the work 
of the first conflicted advisor.  The present experiment did not impose those 
costs on the laypersons, but instead provided the second opinion for free.  It is 
a context-dependent empirical question whether the additional costs will 
outweigh the biases imposed by the first conflicted advisor.  Thus, policies that 
align incentives in the first place may be more efficient, if there are viable 
mechanisms for such alignment in a given market. 
D. A Market for Unbiased Advice 
The foregoing findings suggest that, to some extent, laypersons can 
themselves incentivize the production of unbiased advice, since in a regime of 
disclosure the laypersons tend to follow non-conflicted advice over conflicted 
advice.  Therefore, if competition exists amongst advisors in something like a 
market, those who credibly avoid conflicting interests may demand a premium 
for their advice. 
receives advice from an advisor with conflicting interests (and a disclosure of the same).  Surprisingly, 
laypersons in 2DR perform significantly worse than those in 2D, where the accurate advice is second (a $0.81 
difference), M2D = 2.74 (SE = 0.27), M2DR = 3.56 (SE = 0.29), t(103) = -2.04, p = .04, r = .20.  Thus, 
sequencing does seem to matter.  A second opinion is apparently more influential, either because the first 
opinion’s disclosure of conflicts primes the layperson to look for a more reliable source of advice, which then 
becomes particularly compelling once found, or perhaps simply because the second source of advice is more 
proximate in time to the decision task, which immediately follows.  Nonetheless, even with this suboptimal 
sequencing and the inclusion of a biased advisor, the point estimate for layperson inaccuracy in 2DR is $3.56, 
precisely the same as in the previous gold-standard condition of 1UA (a single advisor with aligned 
incentives). 
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In some contexts, there may be market actors that will benefit from 
laypersons following unbiased advice and have a mechanism for providing 
such unbiased advice.  If a producer truly does sell the better product, it will 
prefer that laypersons get non-conflicted advice that will help them choose the 
better product.  That is why, for example, carmakers like to brag that a 
purportedly independent expert, such as J.D. Power and Associates, provides 
favorable advice.153  Likewise, in litigation, attorneys often prefer to use 
treating physicians as expert witnesses, since they render opinions without 
influence by the lawyers, in contrast to hired-gun experts that were handpicked 
and coached by attorneys.154  A law that mandates disclosure of conflicts may 
help create such a market for advice, if it draws laypersons’ attention toward 
this issue, and if there are unbiased sources of advice available. 
Nonetheless, a market mechanism would require laypersons to know what 
sort of advice they need and to be willing to pay for it.  It bears emphasis that 
the experimental conditions with multiple advisors did not require the 
laypersons to realize that they needed a second opinion, or to pay for it.  The 
second opinion just appeared alongside the first.  In the real world, advice will 
always have a cost, at least in terms of time and inconvenience, if not in 
service fees charged by the advisor.  Further, unbiased advice will tend to be 
more expensive to a layperson than biased advice, which a third party 
subsidizes. 
Do laypersons have the necessary meta-knowledge, i.e., an understanding 
of their own epistemic strengths and weaknesses, in advisory situations?  Do 
they know whether they need advice, and if so, whether they need non-
conflicted advice, and at what price?  The laboratory experiment allows us to 
approach these questions, albeit only indirectly.  After seeing the photograph 
of each jar, receiving the advice and disclosures (if any), and rendering their 
own estimates, participants were asked, “How confident are in your estimate?  
(10 = very confident, 1 = not confident).”155  The CLM study did not provide 
153 See, e.g., Cambridge PR Group, Ford Surges in J.D. Power and Associates Initial Quality Survey,
READMEDIA, July 13, 2010, http://readme.readmedia.com/Ford-Surges-in-J-D-Power-and-Associates-Initial-
Quality-Survey/1591858 (touting Ford Motor Co.’s “huge accomplishment” of ranking favorably in the J.D. 
Power and Associates survey). 
154 See Robertson, supra note 47, at 194–95.  Indeed, litigants could use a blinding mechanism to more 
regularly bring unbiased experts to trials as a rational strategy for garnering extra credibility from the lay fact-
finder.  See id. at 215.
155 This relationship between subjects’ confidence and accuracy in an estimation task, which is known as 
calibration, has been extensively studied in the judgment and decision-making literature.  See generally Claire 
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such a measure of layperson self-assessment, but it may be useful as a proxy 
for how laypersons will perform in a market for advice.  When given 
incentives for accuracy, one might expect that laypersons would be willing to 
pay more to move to positions of higher confidence as their own best proxy for 
accuracy.  For this proxy to be effective, and for the market to work, there 
must be a significant correlation between the accuracy of layperson estimates 
and their confidence in their estimates. 
Such a hypothesized relationship is not apparent in this data.  Across all 
conditions of the study, there is no relationship between the average accuracy 
of laypersons’ judgments and their average expressed confidence in those 
judgments.156  The participants apparently had no idea as to whether they were 
doing well or poorly.  In contrast, one would have hoped that those in the 
inaccurate conditions, such as those with no advisor or an advisor with a 
disclosed conflict of interest, would express low confidence, such that they 
might be willing to pay a premium to move to a more accurate condition.  This 
was not the case. 
It gets worse when the participants are clustered into the twelve 
experimental conditions, as shown in Figure 1.  There was significant variation 
in average confidence levels between conditions, ranging from 4.69 for 
condition 2D to 6.07 for condition NoAdvisors, a difference of 1.38 on the 10-
point Likert scale.157  Notably, the participants in the NoAdvisors condition are 
much more confident than participants in any other condition, even though 
they perform much worse than in any other condition.  Indeed, there is a strong 
correlation between average layperson inaccuracy by condition and average 
confidence by condition.158  To be clear, this would be a negative correlation 
between accuracy and confidence. 
I. Tsai et al., Effects of Amount of Information on Judgment Accuracy and Confidence, 107 ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 97 (2008) (reviewing this literature). 
156 Pearson r < 0.01, p (two-tailed) = .95. 
157 F(2, 611) = 1.99, p = .04, r = .17; see infra Table 4. 
158 Pearson r = .71, p (two-tailed) = .01. 
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Figure 1: 
Layperson Inaccuracy and Confidence by Condition 
This finding may be peculiar to the particular estimation task utilized in 
this study and in the CLM experiment.  Since coins are a feature of daily life, 
laypersons may have a very high degree of confidence in their own abilities to 
render an accurate assessment, but they actually tend to systematically 
underestimate the value of coins.  In the NoAdvisors condition, the laypersons 
may have been most confident because they received no information that 
would undermine their prior beliefs.  In other conditions, when advice came 
from advisors with aligned interests (1UA) or from multiple advisors (2N and 
2D), this advice was very persuasive to the laypersons, but it apparently 
created cognitive dissonance with the laypersons’ prior beliefs and may have 
thereby undermined the laypersons’ confidence.  When the advice was even 
worse in the 1BC and 1BCB conditions, the laypersons could confidently 
disregard it as unreliable and proceed with their own estimates. 
These findings illustrate the complexity of setting policy to improve 
laypersons’ epistemic performance.  One cannot blindly assume that 
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laypersons will pay for the quality of advice they need, or be able to assess 
accurately the quality of the advice that they receive.159  Economists use the 
term credence goods for products, like expert advice, for which the buyer has 
little ability to monitor quality.160  Unlike other products and services, the 
market for advice is defined by the layperson’s own epistemic incompetence.  
This is especially true in the health care context.  As Marc Rodwin explains, 
“[P]atients are particularly vulnerable. . . .  They often have little opportunity 
to learn from personal experience, or the cost of doing so may be high.  These 
constraints distort their choices as consumers and increase their reliance on the 
recommendations of their physicians.”161  In other real-world settings, 
laypersons do receive feedback about the decisions they make—for example, 
they watch as their 401(k) accounts soar or fall compared to benchmark 
indexes.  The present study provided laypersons with no such feedback.  Still, 
in the real world, the feedback may come too late to be actionable and may 
come in forms that are not particularly intelligible to the layperson, if there are 
no clear comparisons or baselines available. 
These experimental conditions suggest that much will depend on which 
advisors happen to get to laypersons first, because once a layperson–advisor 
relationship is created, it is likely to be sticky.  A layperson with a highly 
conflicted advisor would appear to proceed with a high degree of confidence 
and would be unlikely to switch advisors.  Unfortunately, in a market setting, 
the most highly conflicted advisors likely have the greatest incentives to 
aggressively find and recruit layperson clients.  At this point, policymakers 
may have few options.  Once the layperson has a relationship with a conflicted 
advisor, a mere disclosure may not be enough to break that connection.  This is 
especially true when the costs of the conflicted advisor are completely 
subsidized or already sunk, but the layperson would have to pay for a second 
opinion from an unbiased advisor.162  Thus, the key task for policymakers is to 
find ways to get unbiased advisors to laypersons in the first place. 
159 See Hadfield et al., supra note 15, at 144 (“The complex nature of information also requires careful 
analysis of the potential for market mechanisms to provide the information consumers might want and need.  
Information is a notoriously difficult commodity over which to contract.  Potential buyers of information have 
difficulty determining, in their uninformed state, the value of the information and thus the price they are 
willing to pay for it.  Sellers of information run the risk of revealing their information, and thus the commodity 
they hope to sell, by the very terms on which they offer to sell. . . .  These observations counsel care in relying 
on market information intermediaries to resolve the problems of information in consumer markets.”). 
160 See Winand Emons, Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts, 28 RAND J. ECON. 107, 107 (1997). 
161 Rodwin, supra note 31, at 1406. 
162 See Hadfield et al., supra note 15, at 145 (“Information is costly and so consumers rationally make 
choices between being better informed and settling for a less informed but less (transaction) costly option.”). 
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CONCLUSIONS—ELIMINATING BIASES WITH SOUND POLICY
In the modern capitalist society, reliance relationships based on epistemic 
asymmetry will only grow in importance as transactions become more 
sophisticated and the need for specialization grows.  It seems clear that 
conflicts of interests and resulting biases will only proliferate as those with 
expertise, or the appearance thereof, seek to exploit those advantages.  Thus, 
this Article has sought solutions. 
Still, this study had several noteworthy limitations.  First, the coins-in-jars 
estimation task may not be comparable to all (or any) real-world contexts faced 
by laypersons.  Future studies should create more realistic decision situations, 
such as that facing a patient deciding whether to take a prescribed drug as his 
conflicted doctor recommends, or that of an investor deciding whether to buy 
the stock recommended by the conflicted advisor.  The advantage of the coins-
in-jars estimation task is that it was concrete (with a right or wrong answer 
knowable by the researcher), and it was conducted realistically (human 
subjects were not asked to pretend that they were actually a patient in a 
treatment situation).  This study also lacked feedback for laypersons, which 
may be present in some real-world situations.  Future studies should also 
employ a more nuanced model of the market for multiple sources of advice, 
allowing laypersons to choose whether to purchase second opinions, and 
impose transaction costs on those choices.  Further studies should also explore 
the effects on advisors of the various policy mechanisms tested on laypersons 
here, including actual bias disclosures and second opinion mandates. 
The present empirical study has yielded several important conclusions.  
First, it has added further credence to Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore’s 
observation that disclosure mandates can makes matters worse, if they worsen 
the advice given but fail to help laypersons truly improve their own estimates.  
By measuring epistemic asymmetry (relative expertise) and the degree of 
advisor bias, however, the present study has revealed the contingent nature of 
such conclusions.  This more nuanced account allows analysts to begin 
thinking more clearly about the contexts in which a disclosure mandate or even 
a ban on conflicted advice may be worthwhile.  Although epistemic asymmetry 
is a pervasive feature of modern life, so too is epistemic charlatanism and 
biased advice.  In these situations, a disclosure mandate may be salubrious, if it 
drives laypersons away from bad advice. 
Still, the present study has explored several ways to improve disclosure 
mandates, even where expertise is real.  For initial interactions with advisors, it 
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helped to provide disclosures before conflicted advice, but the effect 
diminished with iterative interactions with the same advisor. 
The study also explored the possibility of implementing disclosure 
mandates that focus on actual biases, rather than mere conflicts of interest.  
The present study found, however, that disclosure of actual advisor bias did not 
improve average performance compared to disclosure of mere conflicting 
interests.  Still, bias disclosures did help significant portions of the population 
outperform those in the conditions with mere conflicts disclosures.  Further 
research is necessary to identify contexts in which biases can be calculated 
reliably, and to understand how to best communicate that information to 
laypersons so that it is useful to them. 
This Article also explored mechanisms for tailoring disclosure mandates to 
particular subpopulations that actually receive biased advice.  Analysis 
revealed that a mandate to disclose conflicting interests can hurt the potentially 
large proportion of laypersons who are nonetheless receiving accurate advice.  
Thus, disclosure mandates should not be imposed unless there is particularized 
evidence of an actual advisor being biased, and then disclosure mandates 
should be tailored to the particular laypersons receiving biased advice.  On the 
other hand, the present study demonstrated that even when an advisor has 
aligned interests, a disclosure helps laypersons place their reliance and improve 
performance.  Affirmative disclosures can help with a trust deficit. 
A primary finding of the present study is that a disclosure mandate 
improves layperson performance when unbiased advice is available too, as 
may be true in many market settings.  A second opinion from an unbiased 
advisor is a much better remedy for biased advice than disclosure.  Indeed, 
disclosure of conflict plus a second opinion from an unbiased advisor helps 
laypersons perform as well or better than simply providing accurate advice in 
the first place.  Still, it bears emphasis that this is just a complicated way of 
rectifying the problem that the original advisor had conflicting interests. 
Notwithstanding the love for market-based solutions amongst both scholars 
and politicians, this study strikes a pessimistic note, given its findings about 
laypersons’ self-assessments.  This study found an inverse relationship 
between laypersons’ accuracy and their own confidence in their performance.  
The present study suggests that policymakers should give increasing attention 
to policy mechanisms that align the interests of advisors and laypersons, and 
that channel laypersons toward unbiased advice, which is the strongest 
determinant of layperson performance. 
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX
This Appendix provides details about the methods used in the experiments.  
Human subjects were recruited from e-mail lists and websites nationwide, 
including Craigslist, Facebook, and Amazon Mechanical Turk, to complete the 
study hosted on a third-party website.163  Participants completed an online 
informed consent form approved by Harvard University’s Institutional Review 
Board.  The 198 participants recruited from Mechanical Turk were paid $0.10 
to $0.15 each to complete the study, in addition to an accuracy-based $100 
prize drawing.  The remaining 545 participants received no payments for 
participation but were eligible for a $100 prize for accuracy.  All the subjects 
were told: “The person who gets closest to the actual value most often wins the 
$100 prize.  So try your best to be accurate.” 
As shown on Table 1, the present study has replicated the findings from 
CLM’s classroom-based study, which thereby calibrates the present study’s 
experimental design, making subsequent findings commensurate.  Three 
experimental conditions were nearly identical to those tested in the CLM 
study, though the conditions were renamed for consistency with the other 
conditions tested here: 
• 1UA (with one unbiased advisor and a disclosure that interests are 
aligned, corresponding to CLM’s “accurate” condition); 
• 1BN (with one biased advisor and no disclosure, corresponding to 
CLM’s “high/undisclosed” condition); and 
• 1BC (with one biased advisor and a disclosure of conflicting 
interests, corresponding to CLM’s “high/disclosed” condition).164
Although the standard deviations are higher in the present study, the point 
estimates for the means are quite similar across the CLM study and the present 
163 See Gabriele Paolacci et al., Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT &
DECISION MAKING 411 (2010) (describing the increasing use of Mechanical Turk by social scientists). 
164 See Cain et al., supra note 32, at 10.  In addition to the methodological differences noted above (i.e., an 
online study versus a classroom study, and no participants assigned to the advisor role), there was one other 
difference between the CLM study and the present study.  In CLM, the final three jars were “feedback rounds” 
in which the actual value of the jars was revealed to estimators after they rendered their estimates.  CLM found 
no significant effects from this feature.  Id. at 18.  The feature was excluded here partly because of a concern 
that participants would communicate the right answers to future participants who might learn of the study 
through social networking sites. 
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study, with no more than a statistically insignificant difference of $0.33 for 
comparable conditions. 
This cross-study comparison should lend additional credence to both the 
CLM study and the present study, and has methodological interest, since it 
helps validate these two different approaches to behavioral research.  Cain and 
colleagues paid a relatively homogenous group of Carnegie Mellon University 
students an average of $10 each to participate,165 while the present study 
recruited participants nationwide at an average cost of only $0.18 each, 
including both the per-person payments (zero to $0.16 each) and the $100 prize 
drawing.  The fact that this study has replicated a classroom study, and has 
done so with arguably broader external validity at one-fiftieth of the cost per 
participant, is promising for the future of empirical legal studies.   
The participants in the present study were 72% white/Caucasian.  
Approximately a third had “some college” for their highest educational level, 
and another third had graduated from college.  The mean age was thirty-three, 
with only about a quarter being the college age of eighteen to twenty-two 
years.  Thus, this sample is somewhat more heterogeneous and more 
representative of the American population than the CLM sample, though it is 
still far from a demographically valid sample. 
Table 2 shows the photographs of six jars used in this study (at reduced 
size), along with the actual values of the coins in those jars,166 the mean 
personal estimates rendered by advisors in the accurate condition,167 the mean 
advice given in each condition,168 and the mean estimates rendered by 
unadvised laypersons in each condition (from the present study). 
Table 3 summarizes the conditions employed in this study, manipulated 
according to the number of advisors (zero, one, or two), the quality of the 
advice (accurate, biased, or even more biased because of a disclosure 
mandate), and the type of disclosure given (none, disclosure of conflicting 
interests, or disclosure of average bias).  Table 3 also lists the number of 
participants in each condition (n), the primary dependent variable used in the 
study, which is the mean inaccuracy defined in terms of virtual error,169 and the 
standard deviation (SD). 
165 See id. at 9. 
166 See id. at 14 tbl.4. 
167 See id.
168 See id. at 13, 15 tbl.5. 
169 See discussion supra note 70. 
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Table 4 reports the actual errors, in contrast to the “virtual errors” discussed 
in the body of this Article, along with laypersons’ self-reported confidence in 
their estimates, by condition. 
Table 1:  
Comparison of Layperson Virtual Error in CLM and Present Study 
Condition 
CLM Study Present Study Difference of 
Means 
(p value)n mean SD n mean SD 
accurate 










26 4.52 1.58 43 4.85 2.65 -0.33  (.57) 
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Table 2:  
The Experimental Stimuli 
Actual Value: 







































































Average Across All Jars
Actual Value: 
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* Advice given was equal to that given in CLM’s “high-disclosed” condition; other 
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Table 4:  
Actual Errors and Layperson Confidence
Condition n
Layperson Actual Error
(estimate minus truth) Layperson Confidence 
Mean SD Mean SD 
1UA 39 4.88 2.72 4.77 1.90 
1BC 116 6.42 3.51 5.10 1.89 
1BN 43 4.95 3.47 5.38 1.82 
1UC 53 6.35 3.42 5.25 1.89 
1UN 52 6.12 3.42 5.40 1.61 
1BCB 56 6.67 4.00 5.18 2.17 
NoAdvisors 42 11.65 3.84 6.07 2.01 
2N 57 4.82 3.15 4.79 1.98 
2D 53 3.47 1.24 4.69 2.21 
2DR 52 4.24 2.46 5.14 1.96 
1BCF 114 5.95 3.18 5.13 1.93 
1BCBF 66 6.29 3.42 4.87 2.23 
